

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>xi</i>
<i>List of Tables, Figures and Boxes</i>	<i>xii</i>
<i>List of Acronyms</i>	<i>xiv</i>
1 Studying Migration and Mobility in the European Union	1
Migration and EU population	6
Key questions	7
The EU's role	7
Multilevel politics	10
The paradox of Europe's borders	11
The politicisation of migration	12
The complexities of European migration politics and policy	17
Organisation of the book	19
2 Migration and Migration Policy in Europe	21
Migration and refugee flows in Europe since World War II	21
Making sense of migration	26
Labour migration	27
The core dilemma	29
Family migration	29
The core dilemma	30
Irregular migration	30
The core dilemma	31
Asylum and refugee flows	31
The core dilemma	33
Intra-EU mobility	33
The core dilemma	33
Integration	33
The core dilemma	33
Understanding the policy process: policy failure or securitisation?	34
Policy failure	34
Securitisation	36
Understanding migration policymaking	37
A framework for analysis of European migration politics	38
'Talk', 'decision' and 'action'	39
Deliberate malintegration	40
The policy stream	41
Summary	42

3	The EU Dimension of Migration and Asylum Policy	43
	Stability and change	44
	The multilevel setting of EU policy	47
	EU institutions	47
	Schengen	50
	The Commission's role	52
	The JHA Council	53
	The European Council	53
	The European Parliament	53
	Relocation, relocation, relocation	54
	Spatial relocations of competence and capacity to act	54
	Temporal shifts in the making and operation of European migration policy	55
	A social relocation and its effects on migration and mobility in the EU	55
	Europeanisation	56
	Analysing the effects of EU migration and asylum policy	58
	Narratives and ideas	58
	Politics and political mobilisation	59
	Public administration	59
	Implementation	60
	Summary	60
4	Labour Migration	62
	Explaining labour migration policy	62
	Narratives	66
	Economic arguments	67
	Political debate	70
	Germany and the UK: making the case for labour migration?	71
	Spain and Italy: new immigration countries with fluctuating approaches	73
	The EU's limited role in labour migration policy	74
	Commission forays	74
	New EU thinking on migration and mobility?	76
	Administrative practice and implementation	77
	Bureaucracies and labour migration	77
	Conclusion	80
5	Family Migration	81
	The centrality of family migration	82
	The right to family migration?	83
	Narratives	84
	What is the family?	85
	The demand for family migration	86
	Political debate	88
	The EU's role	90
	The EU's Family Reunion Directive	91

Administrative practice and implementation	92
Conclusion	94
6 Irregular Immigration	95
The dark side of admissions policies	95
Narratives	97
The contest to define the issues	98
Terms and their shortcomings	99
The ‘migration industry’	102
The fight against irregular immigration	104
Political debate	106
The EU and the issue of return	107
Administrative practice and implementation	109
Non-deportability	111
Conclusion	112
7 Asylum	113
EU cooperation on asylum: key themes	115
Policy aims and evolution	118
Narratives	120
Political debate	122
Competing visions	123
Attitudes to asylum	126
Preventing arrivals	126
Administrative practice and implementation	128
Misfit between regulations and administrative capabilities	128
The limits of restrictive approaches	129
Conclusion	130
8 Mobility and Citizenship	132
The EU framework	133
Narratives	134
Mobility, the free movement of workers and migration	136
EU citizenship	139
The Erasmus programme, mobility and European identity	141
Political debate	144
Administrative practice and implementation	147
Conclusion	149
9 Immigrant Integration	151
Narratives	153
Levels and dimensions	154
Political debate	157
The EU dimension	159
Soft governance	162

Externalisation of immigrant integration	163
Administrative practice and implementation	163
Conclusion	167
10 Conclusion	169
Politics and politicisation	170
Multilevel politics	171
Thinking about the future	172
<i>References</i>	174
<i>Index</i>	194

1 Studying Migration and Mobility in the European Union

'Eleven months in Moria, Moria, Moria, it's very traumatic', said former Congolese political prisoner Michael Tamba, who was housed in the Moria camp on the Greek island of Lesbos. By the end of 2018, the camp was housing around 9,000 migrants despite its intended capacity being for only 3,100 people. At the height of Europe's 'migration crisis' in 2015, many of those who made it to Lesbos and other Greek islands after a perilous sea crossing from Turkey were effectively waved through. Around 1 million people moved on to Germany in 2015 alone. By 2018, European Union (EU) member states had imposed strict controls on this kind of onward 'secondary' movement. Michael Tamba was effectively trapped on Lesbos, unwilling to go back to Congo, unable to move on and so desperate that he tried to take his own life (Kingsley 2018). The *New York Times* commented that the terrible conditions in camps such as Moria were actually part of a deliberate strategy by EU governments to deter migrants from moving to Europe. This strategy also included tighter controls on onward movement within the EU as well as efforts to work with non-EU member states such as Turkey to prevent people crossing by sea to Greece.

The situation experienced by Michael Tamba reflects the conscious decisions of EU governments. In August 2015, Germany had opened its borders to Syrian refugees, which encouraged hundreds of thousands of people to move there. As flows across the Mediterranean increased in 2015 and into 2016, urgent measures were put in place by EU governments to try to reduce the numbers of arrivals and to stop onwards movement within the EU. An effect of this was the re-imposition of border controls within the Schengen area (the EU's own system of passport-free travel). Meanwhile, greater efforts were made by the EU to get non-EU member states to stop people moving to the EU or, if they did get to Europe, to return them to the countries they came from. The EU-Turkey agreement of March 2016 contributed to major reductions in numbers of people moving across what was called the 'eastern Mediterranean route' from Turkey to Greece. EU member states found it very difficult to reach agreement on a common approach within the EU. 'Frontline' states such as Greece and Italy wanted to see the relocation of asylum applicants to other EU member states in the name of solidarity while there was also strong vocal opposition to such plans, particularly from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. While EU member states squabbled, public trust and confidence in governments declined, public concern about immigration grew and there was increased support for anti-immigration political parties.

By 2019, the numbers of people crossing the Mediterranean to try to enter an EU member state had fallen significantly, although the death rate remained high. In terms of numbers, more than 1 million people entered the EU via Mediterranean sea crossings in 2015. Since then, numbers crossing the Mediterranean have fallen steeply, to 383,000 in 2016, 185,000 in 2017 and 141,000 in 2018. Notably, the death rate increased with 3,771 people dead or missing in 2015, 5,096 in 2016, 3,139 in 2017 and 2,277 in 2018 (UNHCR 2019a). The ‘crisis’ understood as being about numbers swiftly mutated into a crisis of politics, policies and institutions. In March 2019, this fall in numbers led the European Commission to declare that the Union was ‘no longer in crisis mode’, although perhaps this message had not got through to voters, as immigration was a highly salient issue at the 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections.

The story and situation of Michael Tamba reflects wider social and political issues affecting the EU, but that are also linked to the EU’s place in the international system. As we show in this book, the actions taken after 2015 drew from an existing template of approaches and actions that the EU had been developing since the 1990s. Michael Tamba was seeking refuge, but EU member state governments seem to have become increasingly sceptical of claims for protection as refugees made by people such as Mr Tamba. There can be significant variation in the way different types of migrants are treated in politics and reported on by the media. In this case, the migrants in question are people seeking refuge. The story would have been different if the migrants concerned were labour migrants moving into high-skilled employment or seeking to join family members. In fact, these forms of migration tend not to be news stories. Places such as the Moria camp have become associated with Europe’s ‘migration crisis’ (see Box 1.1 below).

Migration by those seeking refuge and protection has an EU-wide resonance. While the vast majority of people displaced by the Syrian conflict actually moved to the neighbouring countries of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey (around 5 million people by summer 2019), the influx of 2015 sent shock waves across the EU (UNHCR 2019b). New controls were introduced at the borders of member states, but attempts at EU-wide cooperation foundered, as tensions bubbled to the surface between member states. Plans for the relocation of asylum applicants agreed by EU member states in September 2015 effectively failed because some member states simply refused to share responsibility. While the numbers of people entering the EU via sea crossings fell dramatically after 2016, the political salience of immigration remained high. This could suggest that the migration crisis was actually a crisis of politics, of trust and confidence in political institutions and in political leaders. In this way, migration has had profound effects on politics in EU member states and at EU level. It is not overly dramatic to state that migration was a defining issue for the EU in the 2010s with a widespread perception that policies were failing.

So far, the discussion has been largely about crisis, displacement and the forms of mobility associated with them that often lead to representations of migration as motivated by desperation, with those who move seen as passive victims of forces beyond their control. There is another way of thinking about migration if we consider that, in 2017, 3.1 million people were issued a ‘first residence permit’ by an EU member state (Eurostat 2018a). These were people moving for employment, to

Box 1.1 The 'crisis'

Media coverage and political representations of migration in 2015 in particular were dominated by images of mass displacement, of human misery and also of death, given that thousands of people lost their lives trying to cross the Mediterranean into Europe. In 2015 alone, around 1.2 million people claimed asylum in an EU member state (440,000 or 35 per cent of these claims were made in Germany). The 'crisis' was powerfully mediated throughout 2015 and into 2016 as a crisis of numbers of migrants. But, by the end of 2015, it was clear that the 'crisis' also had an important political dimension, with EU governments arguing about the appropriate response, while there was also declining levels of public trust in government and political leaders to deal with the issues as well as increased support for anti-immigration political parties. The 'crisis' clearly had various dimensions related both to migration and to the wider political context.

There is no simple or objective definition of crisis. Crises are political constructs that depend on certain interpretations of what is happening and, on the basis of these interpretations, subsequent decisions on courses of action. If the migration crisis is seen as being driven by people smugglers exploiting the situation of helpless refugees, then a response could develop that targets the business model of these smugglers while also, as a side effect, tending to cast migrants as passive victims.

The wider point is that the definition of certain situations as a crisis is not a neutral action. Rather, it has hugely significant political connotations because defining the challenge as a crisis not only entails certain understandings of what is happening (of the causes and effects of migration) but can also entail certain courses of action.

This book refers to the 'migration crisis' as the period of greatly intensified political focus in EU member states and at EU level after 2015. We also contrast this with previous periods labelled as 'crises' and also with what can be called the everyday normality or reality of migration and mobility in the EU. This avoids becoming trapped in a discussion of migration that considers it only in relation to crisis because this can fundamentally misunderstand and misrepresent the diversity of migration and mobility.

join with family, to study and for other reasons that symbolise hope, ambition, love and aspiration. As we show in this book, forms of and motives for migration are diverse, but it is important immediately to consider the ways in which migration is understood and represented because, at a basic level, understandings of the problem or challenge are likely to play an important role in shaping responses.

This book digs more deeply into the political and policy process to explore the dynamics of migration and mobility in the EU: by thinking about different types of migration, exploring policy responses, analysing the EU framework within which

national policies are now located and considering the quite widespread notion of policy failure. The challenge that we set for ourselves is to integrate these various elements into a coherent analytical approach that provides a framework for understanding the EU's impact on migration and mobility (and vice versa). Before we do that, however, there are two important issues that need to be dealt with.

First, we need to specify what we mean by migration. We define an international migrant as someone living outside their country of origin either regularly or irregularly for a period of 12 months or more (IOM 2008: 2). We thus exclude tourism and short-term travel, for business purposes, for example. Look beneath the surface of the 12-month definition and things get more complicated because there is real uncertainty about the meaning of international migration. Temporary and seasonal migration flows are clearly important, but may not fall within the framework of this 12-month definition that is commonly used by policymakers. Immediately, it becomes apparent that international migration can come in many shapes and forms and be simultaneously represented as a solution (to an ageing population, skills shortages), a problem (because of labour market competition or as a threat to national identity) and – perhaps more realistically – as a natural component of an interdependent and globalised international system. Of the world's estimated population of 7.7 billion people in 2019, around 271 million or around 3.5 per cent were international migrants (United Nations 2019). So, with 96.5 per cent of the world's population not moving to another country, international migration is in fact a rather unusual condition. One reason for the relative lack of mobility is the various social, financial and psychological costs of migrating to another country. After all, it is risky and costly to leave one's own country, family and friends and move to another. Another reason is that the countries that receive a lot of migrants – or 'receiving states' – have established elaborate schemes to regulate and control international migration. This is partly why population movement *within* the borders of one country – internal migration – is far more common than international migration. In most countries, such internal movement is subject to few or no restrictions. It is usually only where mobility involves movement between states that it is the object of attempts at control and restriction. It is these efforts to regulate cross-border movement into and between EU countries that are the focus of this book.

Second, as can be seen from this book's title, we refer to migration *and* mobility. We need to be clear from the outset about the distinction that we make between these two types of population movement.

- International migration refers to movement from outside the EU by people who are not nationals of a member state. This extra-EU migration is by non-EU or third country nationals (TCNs).
- EU mobility refers to nationals of EU member states – exercising their rights of free movement as EU citizens.

The prevailing image for most people when 'immigration' is mentioned may well be movement from outside the EU by TCNs. The image then conjured could be of the kind of scene we sketched in this book's first paragraph describing the plight of

people living in the Moria camp on the island of Lesbos. This is not the whole picture; far from it, in fact. International migration has many different motivations, is diverse in the forms it takes, fluid and fast-changing.

The key point here is that there are important legal, social and political distinctions made at EU level between ‘migration’ by non-EU citizens and ‘mobility’ or ‘free movement’ by EU citizens (Recchi et al. 2019). As we show, mobility rights for nationals of member states/EU citizens are a key feature of the Treaty of Rome (1957) and of subsequent treaties and legislation at EU level.

Extra-EU migration by TCNs is a relative newcomer on the EU policymaking scene, essentially since the Maastricht Treaty came into effect in 1993. It is only since the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) that migration and asylum have been included in the EU’s main legal and political framework. For this reason, we focus in particular on the period since the Maastricht Treaty and show that there is something new and distinct about the post-cold-war context. We see:

- Greater intensity of migration flows to and within the EU;
- More countries affected by immigration;
- A growing role for the EU;
- Ostensibly new manifestations of the immigration problem, for example growing concern about irregular flows, people smuggling and human trafficking;
- A more intense politicisation of migration at both member state and EU levels.

By analysing mobility, migration and asylum in this post-Cold-War period, this book deals with a highly topical set of issues that have been highly salient. According to UNDESA and Eurostat data (2019), in absolute terms, Germany was Europe’s largest country of immigration, with 13.1 million immigrants (EU nationals and non-EU nationals) living on its territory in 2019. Next on the list was the United Kingdom (UK), with 9.5 million immigrants, followed by France, with 8.3 million, Italy, with 6.2 million and Spain, with 6.1 million (Eurostat 2019a; UNDESA 2019).

Spain and Italy are often referred to as ‘new’ countries of immigration, although migration to these countries accelerated at the end of the late 1980s and early 1990s, so the novelty of immigration is waning. In both, there has been a rapid increase in the numbers of immigrants. Both the Spanish and Italian governments have been keen to see a stronger EU role in managing migration. Resentment against the EU played a key role in the success at the 2018 elections in Italy of *La Lega* (the League) that, together with the *Movimento 5 Stelle* (Five Star Movement), formed a governing coalition between June 2018 and September 2019. During this period, the Lega’s leader, Matteo Salvini, served as Interior Minister, when he tried to close Italian sea ports to new migrant arrivals because he demanded that other EU member states should commit to greater sharing of responsibility for migrants entering the EU via Italy.

Newer member states that joined the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013 are also showing signs of becoming immigration countries, but as we will see later, an influential block of Central European countries have been vocal opponents of common EU policies on migration and asylum. That said, it is also the case that citizens of these countries have benefitted extensively from EU free movement provisions. Many

Polish citizens, for example, have moved to the UK benefiting from EU free-movement provisions, but with cheap and easy travel options – a ‘Ryanair effect’ named after the discount airline – making return to Poland or movement to another EU member state very feasible.

Migration and EU population

Migration has been, is and will continue to be an important factor in EU population change. EU-wide demographic data consistently show declining birth rates and raise concern about the effects of an ageing population. This has led to discussion about the role that migration can play in offsetting the effects of an ageing population. In 2017, the EU population reached 511.8 million, with slightly more than 3.4 people of working age (aged 15–64) for each person over the age of 65. By 2060, this ratio is projected to fall to 2:1 (two people in work for every person retired). These changes are not evenly distributed. In Italy, in 2016, there were fewer than three people of working age for each person aged over 65 (a 34.3 per cent ratio), with ratios higher than 30 per cent in Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Portugal and Sweden. Belgium, Ireland and the UK all saw much slower increases in old-age dependency ratios, which was linked to the role played by immigration in population growth in these countries (Eurostat 2017a).

Table 1.1 shows that migration is projected to remain an important driver of population growth in the EU. Immigration could be part of the solution to population ageing because it means importing younger people, but it is not a magic bullet – not at least because migrants get old too (see Box 4.1). This means that high levels of immigration would need to be sustained, as the previous wave of migrants themselves would age. There are other possible solutions such as an increase in the retirement age or increased female participation in the labour market that can also help to address some of these problems as well as the effects of technological change on employment. It also seems reasonable to suppose that high and sustained levels of immigration to EU member states would cause some political controversy.

Table 1.1 Projections of population change in the EU, 1 January 2016–1 January 2080 (millions)

Estimated population, 1 January 2016	510,279
Cumulative births	327,121
Cumulative deaths	383,991
Natural change	–56,870
Cumulative net migration	65,521
Total change	8,652
Projected population, 2080	518,798

Source: Eurostat (2017a)

Key questions

So far, we have demonstrated the political salience and complexity of immigration, but to chart a path through them, we identify three sets of questions central to our analysis:

- Given that international migration is highly diverse in terms of the forms it takes, how do we make sense of this diversity and relate it to the politics of migration? How can we distinguish, for example, between the ways in which issues such as asylum, high-skilled migration, irregular migration and intra-EU mobility become social and political issues?
- Given that the politics of migration are complex, how can we make sense of the ways in which migration is articulated as a concern in public debate, in decision-making and then, in policy implementation?
- Given that these are issues with distinct EU competencies, how can we make sense of this EU role and understand what it means for the politics of immigration in Europe?

These three sets of questions concern themselves with different but also closely related aspects of the politics of migration and mobility in Europe. They take seriously the distinctions between: different types of migration, different stages of the political process and the multilevel context of EU politics.

The EU's role

This section – and the rest of this book – make a distinction that is fundamental to the analysis of migration and mobility in the EU. This distinction is between free movement by EU citizens that is guaranteed by a supranational legal framework and migration by non-EU citizens – ‘third country nationals’ – that is more of a hybrid system within which member states remain key actors and there are still limits to supranational competencies.

Immigration and asylum are relative newcomers, but free movement rights are central to the development of the Union and closely associated with its centrepiece: the single European market with its ‘four freedoms’ (free movement for goods, capital, services and people). The EU's Treaty framework, as it has developed since the 1950s, initially provided free movement rights for workers holding the nationality of a member state. This provision for free movement for workers has since been extended to a more general right of ‘everyday’ free movement (Recchi 2015).

There is a common – albeit not comprehensive – EU migration and asylum policy, which was consolidated by the Lisbon Treaty, after it came into force in December 2009, and that was severely tested by the migration crisis after 2015. EU policy has also increasingly looked beyond the borders of member states through what is referred to as its ‘external’ approach to migration governance. This is evident in the EU's *Global Approach to Migration and Mobility* (published in 2011) and its *European Agenda on Migration* (of 2015). Both seek to strengthen EU cooperation and find ways to work with non-EU member states.

The EU does not have a comprehensive migration policy because EU policies cover some but not all aspects of migration and asylum. Importantly, the 'core business' of migration policy – the numbers of migrants to be admitted and immigrant integration – remain national responsibilities. The EU's main effects have been on border controls, asylum and irregular migration. EU action has also played a key role in policy change and adaptation in Southern European countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain, and it was a crucial component of adaptation by the 13 countries that joined the EU between 2004 and 2013.

In contrast, migration from outside the EU by TCNs was not part of the founding Treaty and was not included until the Maastricht Treaty came into effect in 1993 and, even then, only in a loose informal way that kept member states firmly in the driving seat. A key impetus for cooperation between EU governments at Maastricht was fear of large-scale migration in the aftermath of the cold war. Europe's post-1989 geopolitical shakeup played a key role in driving EU action on migration because the understanding of Europe changed, becoming wider – as too did the perception of the potential for migration from Eastern Europe as well as from Africa and the Middle East.

By 2009 and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, both migration by TCNs and mobility by EU citizens had become central components of EU action. They must be analysed together if we are to understand how national responses have developed and, moreover, how these national responses mesh with the developing EU framework. Box 1.2 provides a potted history of key EU developments and introduces themes that will be covered in more detail in the chapters that follow. What is demonstrated generally is the intensification of EU action since the end of the 1990s.

Box 1.2 A potted history of EU mobility, migration and asylum policy

Mobility rights

Free movement for workers was a key provision of the Treaty of Rome (1957). An EU-wide law introduced in 2004 replaced 10 previous pieces of legislation to create a common framework specifying that all EU citizens have a right to move to another member state, to take family members with them and to become resident in that state, provided that they are able to support themselves.

Immigration and asylum policy

The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in 2009, marked the incorporation of migration and asylum within the Treaty framework and the application of the EU's 'Ordinary Legislative Procedure'. This meant that migration and asylum became 'normal' EU issues with qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council, 'co-decision' on laws between the Council and the European Parliament and jurisdiction for the EU's Court of Justice (ECJ) to consider annulment of legislation, to rule on failure to act on the part of EU institutions and in cases of infringement where member states have failed to fulfil their obligations.

Articles 77–80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union set out provisions on borders, asylum and migration:

- Article 77 (1) provides for the absence of internal border controls, checks at external borders and an integrated approach to border management.
- Article 77 (2) provides for the following measures:
 - Common policy on visas and short-term residence permits;
 - Checks to which those crossing external borders are subject;
 - Conditions under which TCNs are free to travel within the EU;
 - Gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders;
 - The absence of controls on those crossing internal borders;
- Article 77 (3) provides that, where it is necessary to facilitate mobility rights, the Council may adopt measures on passport, identity cards, residence permits and other such documents. The Council must act unanimously and consult the European Parliament (i.e. this is not covered by co-decision procedures, under which the Parliament has more powers).
- Article 78 deals with a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection, comprising:
 - A uniform status of asylum for TCNs valid throughout the EU;
 - A uniform status of subsidiary protection for TCNs;
 - A common system of temporary protection for displaced persons in the event of a massive inflow;
 - Common procedures for granting and withdrawing uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status;
 - Criteria and mechanisms for allocating responsibility for asylum claims;
 - Standards concerning reception of applications for asylum or subsidiary protection;
 - Partnership and cooperation with third countries to manage inflows of persons applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection;
- Article 79 sets out a common immigration policy, comprising:
 - Conditions for entry and residence and standards on the issue of long-term visas and residence permits;
 - Definition of the rights of TCNs legally residing in a member state, including free movement and residence in other member states;
 - Irregular immigration and unauthorised residence;
 - Combating people trafficking.
- Article 79 (3) allows for the conclusion of readmission agreements between the EU and third countries.
- Article 79 (4) provides for the possibility of incentive measures to promote integration of legally resident TCNs.
- Article 79 (5) states that measures on immigration ‘do not affect the right of member states to determine volumes of admission of TCNs coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed.’

Article 80 provides for ‘solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility’ in the areas of migration and asylum.

All the various issues covered by the treaties specified in Box 1.2 are analysed more fully in the chapters that follow. It is not possible to account for the contemporary politics of migration in Europe without accounting for the EU dimension; but likewise, this EU dimension cannot be accounted for without analysis of political responses in member states. The politics of migration and mobility in the EU are thus entwined, multilevel and multi-dimensional.

Multilevel politics

We need to think about what this ‘multilevelness’ might actually mean in practice, how it is made manifest and its implications for understandings of immigration policy and politics that have often been seen as closely bound by national contexts of particular European states. EU politics are multilevel, but this does not get us far because all political systems are multilevel to some extent. To move beyond stating the obvious, we have to decipher particular aspects of multilevelness, as they impinge on EU migration politics. This means looking at the distribution of power and authority in the EU across levels of governance, thinking about the actors involved in these processes and about interactions between levels and actors.

The rise of the EU has been described as amounting to a ‘rebundling’ of authority (Ansell 2004), with important implications for borders, sovereignty, territory, territorial relationships and population control. This rebundling can help to generate some questions that specify key aspects of multilevel politics:

- How, why, when and in what form have EU governance structures emerged and developed?
- How do they impinge on policy areas that are closely associated with national sovereignty?
- Which actors have been empowered within this multilevel system?
- How does this multilevel distribution of power and authority play out across different types of migration policy, as in some areas there is a strong EU role (for example asylum) while in others the EU role (for example admissions policy) is less developed?
- How do EU member states seek to shape and influence EU policy? But also, how has EU action affected policy in member states?
- How has growing EU competence for migration contributed to both the politicisation of migration and to the growth of Euroscepticism?

In addressing these questions, we show that the EU framework is *partial*, as it does not cover all aspects of migration and asylum policy, and *differential*, in that its effects are more pronounced on some member states than on others. We show significant variation by policy type and that this then helps us to better understand relationships between member states and the EU as well as public reactions to immigration.

The paradox of Europe's borders

This focus on multilevelness also points to the paradox of Europe's borders: the EU and its member states are simultaneously removing some borders, relocating others and building new ones. This paradox could actually be seen as an EU-level reflection of responses to population control and immigration that developed at state level from the nineteenth century, as internal consolidation of territory associated with state-building was accompanied by moves to regulate access to that territory (Bade 2003). Such processes were integral to the establishment of states' sovereign authority (Krasner 1999). This is one fairly obvious reason why member states can get so worked up about immigration and its effects, as immigration goes to the very heart of their self-definition as states. Member states do not passively observe these developments; they are key players.

It is the borders of states that make international migration visible as a distinct social process. If there were no such things as state borders, then there would be no such thing as international migration (Zolberg 1989). It is the categories and meanings attached to international migration at Europe's borders that are central to the analysis that follows. We need to understand how organisations and institutions 'make sense' of international migration (Weick 1995). One way they make sense of international migration is to put migrants into categories – 'high-skilled migrant', 'low-skilled migrant', 'family migrant' and the like – that each determines conditions of entry, residence and associated rights and entitlements. As Bowker and Leigh Star (1999: 5) put it:

'Each standard and each category valorises some point of view and silences another. This is not inherently a bad thing – indeed it is inescapable. But it is an ethical choice, and as such it is dangerous – not bad, but dangerous.'

Categorisations that occur at Europe's borders are central to the understanding of migration as a set of issues and concerns within the EU's multilevel system and to the constitution of a European political space. They can have a profound resonance that amounts to far more than just their representation as lines on maps. As Walker (2006: 57) points out:

'Almost all the hard questions of our time . . . converge on the status of borders; of boundaries, distinctions, discriminations, inclusions, exclusions, beginnings, endings, limitations and exceptions, and on their authorization by subjects who are always susceptible to inclusion or exclusion by the borders they are persuaded to authorize.'

Where are the borders at which these categorisations occur? They are most obviously territorial (land, air and sea), but they can also be 'organisational' (governing access to, for example, the labour market and welfare state) and can be 'conceptual' (concerned with questions of identity and belonging) (Geddes 2005). Borders are

central to the analysis of migration, but they are not some natural and immutable presence in the global order. Borders as powerful social constructions govern access to resources and signify a powerful relationship between controllers and those who are controlled (Sack 1986). They tell us something about relations between ‘us and them’. Borders are intrinsically and inescapably political and are our route to the analysis of migration and mobility in the EU.

The politicisation of migration

Wrapping analysis of migration and mobility in the EU in the often very technical language of European integration could disguise the fundamentally political nature of the issues that are at stake. We now identify some key trends in public attitudes to migration as well as important developments in public debate. In 2016, Bloomberg News reported that anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe was rising. Similarly, a UK news website claimed, in 2016, that ‘It’s a Brexit world’, as a tide of anti-immigration sentiment swept the globe. There were concerns at an official level too. In a January 2015 speech, the European Commissioner responsible for migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos stated that: ‘we need to change the perception of the public opinion on migration. Our biggest concern is the rise of racism and xenophobia fuelled by populist movements across the EU’ (cited in Dennison and Geddes 2018b). Disentangling these reports and speeches, we can detect some common beliefs, although, as we show, these may not be well founded. These commonly held beliefs are that anti-immigration sentiment across the EU is increasing, which fuels support for anti-immigration movements and that efforts should be made to change peoples’ attitudes. We now take each of these claims in turn to show that: (i) there is little to suggest that a tide of anti-immigration sentiment is sweeping across the EU; (ii) opposition to immigration is linked to issue salience – the importance people attribute to the immigration issue and not to generalised anti-immigration attitudes; (iii) trying to change in fundamental ways how people think about immigration neglects decades-worth of research on the formation and effects of attitudes to political issues, including immigration; and (iv) research evidence suggests that support for and opposition to both immigration and European integration may be coalescing into a new dividing line, or cleavage, in European politics.

First, there is little to suggest that there is a rising tide of anti-immigration sentiment sweeping across the EU. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show attitudes to migration from outside and from within the EU for selected EU countries and the EU average. The picture is different in Central Europe, where despite there being small immigrant populations, governments such as the Hungarian government of Viktor Orbán have adopted anti-immigration positions and where attitudes are more negative. What we can see is that attitudes to non-EU migration (Figure 1.1) and intra-EU migration (Figure 1.2) became more favourable in most EU member states even during the so-called crisis after 2015, as was notably the case in Germany, which was the main destination. This does not mean that there is a tide of pro-migration sentiment sweeping across the EU, there is clearly a lower level of

favourability towards non-EU migrants, as Figure 1.1 shows. That said, those expressing a favourable opinion towards non-EU migrants have increased as a proportion of the EU population. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show that we should not take for granted claims that attitudes to migration have become less favourable, when evidence suggests greater favourability over time.

If attitudes are not becoming less favourable, then how do we explain the increased support for anti-immigration political parties? While patterns are not uniform, anti-immigration political parties performed well in elections in 2017 and 2018 in Austria, France, Hungary, Sweden and Italy. Opposition to immigration was a key driver of the Brexit vote in the UK in 2016 (Dennison and Geddes 2018a). Anti-immigration parties also saw their support increase at the May 2019 European Parliament elections. Issue salience plays a powerful role in explaining the success of anti-immigration parties. Salience means the importance that people attribute to the issue. In the Autumn 2018 Eurobarometer survey, immigration was identified as one of the two most pressing concerns by 40 per cent of EU citizens. We should not assume that these 40 per cent were all anti-immigration. It is likely that some were concerned from a more pro-immigration stance. There is, however, a fairly strong




Figure 1.1 Attitudes to immigration from outside the EU in 2014 and 2018

Net perceptions for each country have been calculated as the sum of those responding as ‘very positive’ and ‘positive’ to the Eurobarometer question ‘Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you: “Immigration of people from outside the EU”’ and those responding as ‘very negative’ and ‘negative’.

Source: data based on Eurobarometer Interactive (2019)




Figure 1.2 Attitudes to immigration from other EU member states in 2014 and 2018
 Net perceptions for each country have been calculated as the sum of those responding as ‘very positive’ and ‘positive’ to the Eurobarometer question ‘Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you: “Immigration of people from other EU Member States”’ and those responding as ‘very negative’ and ‘negative’.
 Source: data based on Eurobarometer Interactive (2019)

correlation between issue salience and support for anti-immigration political parties (Dennison and Geddes 2018b). It was not that Europeans were becoming more anti-immigration, but rather, that latent concerns among sections of the population were being activated. This helps to explain why, at an aggregate level, attitudes can become more favourable, but among more specific sections of the electorate, can become more hostile. Figure 1.3 looks across EU member states to show that immigration has been a highly salient issue seen as an individual issue, as a national issue and, very significantly, as a European issue. Salience declined after the peaks of 2015 and 2016, but in 2018, EU citizens continued to see immigration as one of the most important issues and see it as a European concern.

Perhaps a solution could be to try to change attitudes to migration? In reality, this is likely to be hard to achieve for two reasons. First, attitudes to migration are actually relatively stable over time and, as with attitudes to other political issues, are formed early in life and shaped by important life experiences, such as experience of education. It is likely to be very difficult to shift attitudes not, precisely because they are quite deeply engrained and form part of a person’s worldview. Second, there is evidence that views are actually quite polarised. Those who are concerned about or opposed to immigration might label those who do not share




Figure 1.3 Salience of migration over time (what do you think are the two most important issues facing at the moment? Percentage saying immigration)

Source: Eurobarometer (2014, 2018a)

their views as out-of-touch elitists. Those who are pro-migration and pro-migrant may see advocates of strict controls as ignorant or, worse, as xenophobes or racists. Some people do have xenophobic or racist attitudes, but it is not necessarily racist to be concerned about immigration, and it is possible to be opposed to aspects of immigration without being against immigration *per se*. For example, many people in Europe have conservative value orientations, which means they tend to value order and stability. The images of chaos and disorder associated with boat arrivals during the migration crisis in 2015 may trigger concern amongst people that hold such conservative value orientations that do not oppose immigration *per se* but are unsettled by images that they see as symbolising a lack of control and political leadership. It would be difficult, given that attitudes are deep rooted and rooted in differing worldviews – and perhaps also quite sinister – to argue that the solution would be to change the way that such people think and to re-educate them. Facts do matter, and it is important to try to be clear about them; but immigration is an issue for which values also matter greatly and upon which people respond on an emotional level to the issues. Consistent with their worldview, progressives may well see mobility and diversity as inherently good things that should be

encouraged. People with conservative values are much less likely to see things this way but may value the contribution that migrants make by ‘fitting in’ and ‘playing by the rules’. Progressives might find such tropes irritating, but equally, conservatives are likely to find progressive views irritating. One example of this mutual irritation was the distinction made both before and after the UK Brexit referendum between a supposed pro-EU ‘North London metropolitan elite’ and what were called the ‘real people’ that the anti-EU politician Nigel Farage identified as Brexit supporters the day after the June 2016 vote for Brexit. These are, of course, massive simplifications, but they do suggest the polarisation that can occur on migration issues, where groups of people with very different ways of seeing the world talk past each other (see Box 1.3).

Finally, a wider point can be made about politicisation in relation to deeper-rooted patterns of political conflict in Europe. When an issue such as

Box 1.3 Brexit and the politicisation of migration

On 23 June 2016, the UK voted by a margin of 52–48 per cent to leave the EU. While the debate about the method and manner by which the UK would leave the EU played out for years afterwards, it was clear that immigration was a key factor in the vote to leave (Dennison and Geddes 2018a). More precisely, the politicisation of migration from outside the EU and from within it (more correctly labelled as free movement by EU citizens) was set against already historically higher levels of Euroscepticism in the UK when compared with other EU member states. The UK had actually negotiated a privileged relationship with the EU, as it was not a member of the Schengen Area of passport free travel and held opt-outs from much of the EU’s common framework on migration and asylum. A key moment was the decision by the then Labour government to allow free access to the labour market for citizens of the 10 countries that joined the EU in May 2004, when only Ireland and Sweden decided likewise. This led to a steep increase in movement to the UK by citizens of other EU member states, particularly from Central European countries such as Poland. The Eurosceptic UK Independence Party led by Nigel Farage saw its support grow in ways that threatened the governing Conservative Party. The Conservatives also shot themselves in the foot by imposing a ‘net migration’ target, whereby they claimed they wanted immigration in the UK to be in the tens of thousands, when at the time of the referendum, there was net immigration to the UK of nearly 340,000 in the preceding year. The target was a political disaster because, on a quarterly basis, data were released to show precisely how the government was failing to meet its target. This added fuel to the fire for those linking migration and European integration to make the case for Brexit. ‘Immigration’ clearly played a role, but more specifically, the fusing by the Leave campaign of non-EU migration with EU free movement on top of already high levels of Euroscepticism, all packaged under the alluring slogan of ‘take back control’, was to prove pivotal.

immigration becomes politicised, it is more prominent in political debate, but it is also both more salient and there is greater polarisation between political parties on the issue (Hutter et al. 2016). Research has shown how attitudes to immigration and European integration now form part of a new dividing line, or cleavage, in European politics (Hooghe and Marks 2017; Kriesi et al. 2006). This has also been portrayed as a dividing line between the winners and losers of globalisation or as between cosmopolitans and communitarians (de Wilde et al. 2019). The key observation is that significant research evidence suggests that opposition to European integration and immigration now form a durable component of political contestation in Europe, and that they can also structure competition between political parties.

To sum up, while research shows that there has not been a wave of anti-immigration sentiment sweeping across the EU, it is the case that immigration has become much more intensely politicised in European countries with higher salience and greater polarisation within political systems, plus evidence that being for or against immigration and European integration forms part of a new dividing line in European politics.

The complexities of European migration politics and policy

Having just staked out how important all these issues are both in terms of policy and politics, we could immediately run aground, as we hit a pretty serious problem. Migration and mobility are rather diverse and complex, debates play themselves out in different ways in various EU member states, and it is all very ‘multilevel’. Moreover, the nature and type of these debates may have changed over time. To make things even more complicated, the EU and its institutions are heavily involved in this policy area, which means that we need not only to understand their role but also to penetrate the sometimes rather peculiar and complex ways that the EU itself has of describing its activities (the issuance of ‘Directives’ and ‘Regulations’, the use of ‘qualified majority voting’ (QMV) and so on). If this was not enough, we then need to think about how the EU connects with these domestic debates.

We think that it is important to create a framework that cuts through this complexity without being so simplistic that we lose analytical value. There are three possible ways to go about this:

- We could analyse how, why and when national responses to immigration have changed, but we choose not to do this because this would downplay the ability to look across these countries and pick out points of similarity and divergence.
- We could analyse the rapid development of EU policy and look at how, why and when these competencies have developed, but we choose not to do this because it would tend to separate the EU from the member state contexts that have been so central to the evolution and development of European integration.
- We could analyse migration types – labour, family, asylum, irregular, student, EU mobility as well as debates about immigrant integration – in order to look at

how specific types of migration engender particular forms of political response and at how these play out across the various levels of the EU's multilevel system connecting subnational, national and supranational/EU levels.

We choose this third and last approach because it actually encompasses the other two by allowing analysis of variation by policy type, drawing from experiences in member states *and* accounting for the EU's role.

We focus on migration types but recognise that there are powerful overlaps or linkages between migration categories. We also recognise that categories are fluid and that people move between them with different legal, political and social implications. Someone arriving to study may stay on to work and then be joined by family members. We explore these linkages because it allows us to also analyse the ways in which categories are contingent, conjunctural, interlinked and can change. By doing so, we go to the core of many policy dilemmas that EU states face. We also see that the term 'immigration' is too broad-brush and has very limited analytical usefulness.

To sum up, we focus on different forms of migration for four reasons. First, these are precisely the categories that EU states have developed and use to make sense of international migration. Second, changing understandings of migration are made evident through the redefinition of categories. Third, the forms and types of politics can differ quite substantially by migration type – with, for example, the politics of high-skilled labour migration differing greatly from those for asylum. Finally, the EU uses these categories to make sense of its role in relation to migration and mobility policy.

In the chapters that follow, we will not seek to immerse the reader in all the various complexities of migration policy in all the EU's member states across all main migration types. Nor will we launch into detailed paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of various EU missives (and there are a lot of them). Rather, our objectives are to:

- Create a framework for analysis that distinguishes between: types of migration, aspects of the policy process and the extent to which these aspects of the policy process and types of migration have become part of a wider EU framework for the management of migration and mobility;
- Draw from examples from across the EU to show how these debates play out;
- Assess how, why, when and with what effects the EU now plays a role in migration and mobility and the extent to which this changes the ways in which debate occurs, decisions are made and policies are implemented.

Thus, by providing a map (through, for instance, empirical analysis of different forms of migration and associated forms of politics) and a method (the framework for analysis of migration policymaking and the multilevel EU setting that we develop in Chapters 2 and 3), we can help the reader negotiate and understand these important issues. What should also become clear is the extent to which we have moved from a *politics of migration in Europe* to a *European politics of migration* with some common elements and the EU as a source of pressure for some convergence, but without pretending that member states have somehow been swept helplessly along by the pressures of European integration.

Organisation of the book

In Chapters 2 and 3, we set out a framework for analysing migration policy based on concepts drawn from public policy analysis. After laying the ground for our analysis of European policymaking, Chapters 4–9 address different areas of migration policy. Chapter 4 analyses one of the most important forms of immigration and one that dominated European policy in the decades after World War II – labour migration, or migration for the purpose of paid employment. We show how approaches to labour migration have fluctuated over time and still vary widely between different European countries. While some governments have promoted labour migration as a means of addressing skills and labour shortages, many politicians and sections of the public remain concerned that labour migration can have adverse effects on the domestic population by displacing ‘native’ workers. The chapter also charts how the EU has attempted to increase its competence in this area, with somewhat limited results so far.

If labour migration can form part of a conscious recruitment drive on the part of governments or industry, Chapter 5 deals with a form of migration which tends not to be actively promoted: that of family migration. Family migration has actually often been seen by governments as an unwanted by-product of labour migration, as immigrant workers bring their families or new spouses from abroad to settle in their country of residence. Often seen as a ‘back route’ for immigration, governments and the EU have had to grapple with conflicting considerations in developing policy in this area: the need to respect various international human rights and constitutional provisions on the rights of the family and their increased desire to ‘select’ migrants based on their perceived economic contribution. We show how attempts to introduce restrictive policies are often thwarted in practice and that we need to explore the form taken by the politics of family migration if we are to understand why this is the case, particularly the role played by courts as guarantors of rights.

European countries have found it difficult to enforce watertight control over immigration flows. Chapter 6 deals with the issue of irregular migration by those unable to enter European countries through legal channels. This can be seen as the ‘other side’ of legal migration flows because it is only by defining certain forms of migration as legal that others become defined as illegal. It is also a phenomenon that is difficult to observe and measure, which means that governments often have limited knowledge about these migratory dynamics. Chapter 6 also analyses some of the assumptions made by policymakers about the causes and levels of irregular migration and how they address it through various forms of border control and internal checks; sanctions on those transporting, smuggling or employing irregular migrants; and, more recently, cooperation with some of the non-EU countries from which irregular migrants originate or through which they travel.

Chapter 7 addresses another thorny area of migration: asylum and refugee policy. Asylum is a Europeanised policy area in two senses. First, there is a Common European Asylum System centred on the so-called Dublin principle (whereby the EU country of first arrival takes responsibility for an asylum application). Second,

asylum-seeking migration was central to the crisis of 2015 and to the effective breakdown of the common EU response. Asylum is an area in which EU cooperation is highly developed, so the chapter considers the complex interplay between national and EU policies, including responses to the crisis.

Chapter 8 analyses intra-EU mobility. EU nationals have the right to reside and work in other EU countries, an entitlement enshrined in the Treaty of Rome. Although originally a measure to ensure the more efficient operation of labour markets, mobility rights have been given a more political and civic spin, as the EU has developed since the Maastricht Treaty the concept of 'EU citizenship'. The chapter explores the impact of these provisions on migration between EU countries and how they impact on immigrants from outside the EU. It also considers how, why and when mobility rights became controversial, as 13 new member states joined the EU between 2004 and 2013.

Turning away from different types of migration, Chapter 9 explores how EU states have sought to 'integrate' the migrants who settle on their territory. The background for this is the 'crisis' or 'retreat' of multiculturalism – or, at least, multicultural policies, given that many EU member states are multicultural societies – and a renewed emphasis on socio-economic integration and linguistic adaptation by migrant newcomers. To tie in with the analysis in Chapter 8, we analyse how the EU now intervenes in these debates and how the promotion of EU mobility has also created some space for EU measures on the rights of long-term residents that are not EU citizens and to combat discrimination on grounds of race and ethnicity. We also chart an increased emphasis on conditionality that tempers rights-based claims to welfare-related entitlements, with understandings of who deserves or merits welfare state inclusion. This helps to show how the organization of welfare states and their interactions with labour markets are crucial variables. If we think about these broader factors that influence the organization of welfare and work, we can see that migration is not just about the people that move to the EU, it's also about how EU societies are organized, how they change and about self-understandings.

Chapter 10 is a concluding chapter that ties together some of the themes dealt with in earlier chapters to draw conclusions and consider the implications of our analysis both for the study of migration and for the development of the European politics of migration.

Index

- A8 (accession eight) countries 73–4, 139, 142–3, 148
see also individual countries, Central Europe
- accession/enlargement 45, 52, 57, 73, 75, 139–43, 150
- acts:
British Nationality Act 28–9
Immigration Act 110
Newcomer Integration Act 155
Single European Act 46, 57
- adaptation, *see* cultural adaptation, integration, language
- administrative 39, 62, 80–1
capabilities 132
practice and implementation 62, 95, 112, 132–3, 151–2, 167
- admissions policy 31, 76–7, 81, 108, 113, 153, 176
- Afghanistan 100, 126, 127
- Africa 8, 23–4, 28, 34, 46, 49, 99–100, 106–8, 113, 115, 126, 131, 175–6
see also individual countries, Horn of Africa, North Africa, West Africa
- African Union 108, 131
- ageing population 6, 35, 48, 66–7, 74
- agriculture (sector) 24, 28–9, 71, 75–6, 80, 99, 102
- Albania 27, 127
- America, *see* North America
- Americas, the 33
- Amsterdam Treaty 5, 46–7, 51–2, 55–6, 76, 119, 151, 163
- anti-discrimination 51, 163, 170
- anti-immigrant/immigration 12–16, 109, 126, 148, 157, 173
parties 1, 14, 27, 46, 56, 72–6, 150, 161–3, 170
public sentiment/views 3, 12–16, 26, 58–9, 68, 162, 164
rhetoric 29, 79
opposition to asylum 128, 130
see also populism, racism, radical right, xenophobia
- Aquarius 98
see also boat arrivals, Mediterranean Sea
- Armenia 78
- Asia 23, 24, 34, 91, 126
see also individual countries
- assimilation 84, 155, 161
see also civic integration, integration
- asylum:
asylum applications 46, 48, 53, 113, 120–1, 127
asylum decisions 121, 133
Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) 121, 166
see also integration
Asylum Procedures Directive 121
Common European Asylum System (Dublin principle/system) 20, 32, 48, 53, 118–20, 127–8, 132, 173
EU Agency for Asylum 122
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 121–2
asylum seekers 29, 32–4, 43, 53–4, 69, 89, 93, 117–35
Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum 50
asylum system 32, 34, 53, 117–22, 125, 131–2
temporary protection 9, 21
- attitudes 12–16, 35, 103, 130, 135, 148, 158
see also perceptions, public opinion
- Australia 23, 33
- Austria:
asylum 117–18, 122, 127, 131–4
immigration control/policy 36, 53, 94, 141, 145
integration 94, 155, 157, 160–5
labour migration/workers 13–14, 25, 28, 36, 137, 149, 169–70
political parties 148–9, 163
- Azerbaijan 78, 114
- backlash, *see* anti-immigrant, populism
- Belarus 78

- Belgium 6, 25, 28, 46, 71, 81, 132, 149, 157, 169
- belonging, *see* identity
- Berlusconi, Silvio 80
- bilateral agreements 28, 71, 79–80, 108, 115, 141
- Blair, Tony 73
- Blue Card 48, 77, 81–2, 90
- boat arrivals 2, 16, 98, 100, 103, 112, 129, 174
see also Aquarius, Mediterranean Sea
- border control 1, 8–9, 20, 45, 47–8, 53, 80, 98–9, 105–7, 109, 115, 172–3
see also civic integration, double conditionality, Frontex, language test, migration management, regulations, restrictions, secondary movement
- brain drain 42, 150
see also high-skilled labour, skill shortage
- Brexit 12, 16–17, 24, 149–50, 153, 156
 campaign 139, 148
 vote 14, 26, 52, 75
see also Leave campaign, politicisation of migration
- Brexodus 143
- Britain 36, 142–3, 148–50
see also United Kingdom
- British Nationality Act 28–9
- Bulgaria 6, 25, 52, 139, 157, 162
- bureaucracy 60–3, 81, 97, 152
- Canada 23
- Cape Verde 78, 114
- Caribbean 29
see also individual countries
- case, Alfredo Rendón Marín 136
- Central Europe 5, 13, 17, 29, 49, 57, 66, 73–4, 79, 90, 122, 141, 144, 147, 150
see also individual countries, A8 countries
- chain migration 81–2
- citizenship, *see* EU citizenship
- citizenship law 136, 144, 160
- civic integration 84, 91, 159–60, 164, 168, 170
 definition of 155–6
see also border control, integration, language test, Newcomer Integration Act, norms
- cleavage 13, 16, 176
- coalition government 28, 41, 74
- Cold War 5, 8, 22, 46, 119
- Colombia 24, 26, 136
- colonies/colonial ties 22, 24, 26, 28–9
- Commission, European, *see* European Commission
- Common Agenda for Integration 166
- Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) 78
see also Mobility Partnerships
- Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (Dublin principle/system) 20, 32, 48, 53, 118–20, 127–8, 132, 173
- Common Travel Area 26, 52
- Commonwealth countries 28
see also individual countries
- Communism 22, 34, 49
- conditionality 20, 95, 142–3, 148–9, 151, 153, 164–6
see also double conditionality, integration, language test
- conflict 2, 43, 101, 125, 126, 131
see also violence
- Conservatives 16, 17
- constitutional provisions 19, 38, 73
- control, *see* border control
- construction (sector) 26, 28, 29, 65, 71–2, 75
- cooperation *see* partnership, policy coordination
- council, *see* European Council, Justice and Home Affairs Council
- Council of Ministers 47
- countries of emigration 38, 75
- countries of immigration 5, 28–9, 44, 58, 75, 90, 92, 101–2, 108, 114–15, 161, 169–70
- countries of origin 26–7, 34, 43, 100, 121, 127, 133, 153, 166
- courts 9, 19, 50–1, 82, 86, 91–3, 97, 128, 132–3, 136, 144, 152
see also European Court of Human Rights, European Court of Justice
- crime/criminality 105, 101–3, 110, 112, 114, 126, 136
- crisis, *see* migration crisis, oil crisis
- Croatia 25, 52, 142
- cultural adaptation 158
see also integration, language, norms
- cultural diversity 35, 69, 74, 159, 161

- Cyprus 25, 52, 152, 169
- Czech Republic:
 asylum 1, 57, 117, 128, 133
 immigration control/policy 29, 57, 66
 labour migration/workers 13–14, 25, 66, 73
- Danish People's Party 93
 debate, *see* political debate
 decision-making procedures/process 47, 50, 57, 60, 62, 88–9, 93–4, 121, 171
- Denmark:
 asylum 125, 133
 immigration control/policy 54, 93, 96, 149
 integration 93, 155, 157
 labour migration/workers 25, 77, 111, 169
 deportation 76, 109, 114–15
see also expulsion, non-deportability, return
- destination countries, *see* countries of immigration
- directives 17, 47, 51, 59, 65
 Directive 2004/38/EC 137–8
 Directive 2009/50/EC 77, 82
see also Blue Card
 Directive 2011/24 (healthcare) 150
 Directive, Asylum Procedures 121, 129–30
 Directive, Bolkestein (2006/123) 150
see also EU Constitution
 Directive, Employment Equality 163
 Directive, Family Reunification/the Right to Family Reunion 31, 85–90, 93–7, 164, 170
 Directive, Long Term Residence (2003) 141, 151, 164–5
see also admissions policies, conditionality, Third Country Nationals
 Directive, Posted Workers (2018/957) 149
 Directive, Qualification (2011/95/EU) 119, 129
 Directive, Racial Equality 163
 Directive, Reception Conditions 120
 Directive, Researchers' and Students' 164
 Directive of Return 56, 102, 110–13
 Directive, Temporary Protection 9, 121
- Directorate General 49, 51, 54–55, 80
 discrimination 20, 65, 92, 125, 152, 156, 163
see also anti-immigrant, exclusion
 domestic work/care (sector) 24, 26, 28, 65, 71, 72, 75, 76, 102
 double conditionality 84, 91–5
see also conditionality, family migration, integration
- Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 110
- Dublin principle/system, *see* Common European Asylum System
- East/Eastern Europe 8, 29, 33, 46, 49, 57, 73, 79, 90, 112, 139, 141, 144, 147, 175
see also individual countries, Central Europe, Western Europe
- Ecuador 24, 26
- education 64, 93, 158, 167
 access/inclusion 32, 65, 77, 94–7, 120, 151–2, 155, 159, 170
 higher education 70, 146–7
 elites 72–3, 127, 161
- Emergency Trust Fund for Africa 107
- emigration 22, 29, 114, 147, 150, 153
see also countries of emigration
- enlargement/accession 45, 52, 57, 73, 75, 139–43, 150
- entitlements 11, 20, 138, 149, 156, 167
see also social assistance, welfare
- equal treatment 137–8, 143, 155, 163
- Erasmus programme 145–7
- Eritrea 127
- Estonia 25, 73, 169
- Ethiopia 78, 79
- ethnic 20, 22, 38, 126, 160, 163
see also race/ethnicity
- Europe, *see* individual countries
- Europe 2020 Strategy 140
- European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border, *see* Frontex
- European Agenda for the Integration of Third Country Nationals 166
- European Agenda on Migration (EAM) 8, 47–8, 106, 176
see also European Agenda for the Integration of Third Country Nationals, migration governance
- European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 121

- European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG), *see* Frontex
- European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 86, 133
- European Council 50, 55, 103, 119, 140
- European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 92, 132–3
- European Court of Justice (ECJ) 9, 50–1, 128, 136
- European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) 120
- European Economic Area (EEA) 71
- European Education Area 146
- European identity 145–7
see also identity
- European Integration Network 166
- European Migrant Smuggling Centre 98
- European Migration Forum 166
- European Parliament 2, 9, 14, 47, 50, 54–6, 173
Members of 61, 173
- European People's Party 56, 173
- European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 166
- European Refugee Fund (ERF) 121
see also Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
- European Social Fund (ESF) 166
- European Union (EU), *see individual countries*
- EU 28 24, 162, 169
- EU Agency for Asylum (EUAA) 122
- EU citizenship 20, 34, 136, 143–5, 152–3
- EU Constitution 139, 150
- EU cooperation 83, 98, 132, 134, 175
on asylum 20, 118–20, 126–7
with non-EU member states 8, 107, 115, 123
- EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 7, 78, 128
see also Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility, Mobility Partnerships
- EU institutions 8–9, 45, 49–57, 79, 87, 113, 142, 148, 166
see also individual institutions
- EU Partnership Framework on Migration 107
- EU policy, *see* policy
- Europeanisation 45, 58–9, 95–6, 164, 175
- Euroscepticism/Eurosceptics 11, 17, 26, 126, 148
- Europol 98
- executive branch 51, 82, 85, 91, 92, 96–7
- exclusion 12, 33, 38, 134, 142, 154, 169, 174
see also discrimination
- expansionist, *see* liberalism/liberal approaches
- expulsion 51–2, 110–11, 138
see also deportation, non-deportability, return
- extended family 88, 96
see also family migration
- ex-Yugoslavia 125
see also individual countries, Yugoslavia
- failed policy, *see* policy failure
- family migration 8, 19, 29–31, 51, 77, 84–97, 101, 110–11, 136–9, 144, 152, 161, 174
see also double conditionality
- family reunification/reunion 31, 51–2, 85–90, 93–7, 130, 155, 164, 170
- Farage, Nigel 16–17
- female migration 24, 26, 65, 88, 90–2, 102
see also gender, women
- Finland 6, 25, 119, 169
- Five Star Movement 5, 76
- forced migration, *see* trafficking
- fortress Europe 36, 123
- France:
asylum 46, 118, 122, 125–6
family migration 31, 90, 92
immigration control/policy 5, 66, 71, 132, 145, 157
integration 139, 146, 150, 155, 160, 162
labour migration/workers 13–14, 22–5, 28, 52, 67, 78, 149, 169
political parties 14, 150
- Frattoni, Franco 159
- free movement, definition of 7–9
see also mobility, Schengen, Treaty of Rome
- Frontex (*Frontières Extérieures*) 48, 98, 113–14
- Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) 166
- funds 107, 121, 166
see also individual funds
- Gadhafi, Muammar 107
- gender 24, 26, 65, 81, 84–5, 88–91, 102, 156–7, 159
see also female migration, women

- Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees 33–4, 87, 119, 129–30
- Georgia 78, 127
- Germany:
- asylum 1, 3, 44, 117–19, 124, 127, 133
 - family migration 31, 92, 94–6
 - immigration control/policy 53–4, 73–5, 77, 80–1, 122, 132, 143, 160, 168
 - integration 146, 155, 157, 162
 - labour migration/workers 5–6, 13–14, 23, 25, 27, 30, 46, 52, 64, 67, 70, 139, 149, 169–70
 - political parties 148
 - see also* West Germany
- Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) 7, 78, 128
- globalised/globalisation 4, 16, 72, 75, 139, 148, 160–1, 176
- governance, *see* migration governance, soft governance
- Greece:
- asylum 1, 32, 117–18, 122, 129, 133
 - immigration control/policy 8, 28, 48, 53, 128, 132
 - labour migration/workers 13–14, 25, 71, 169
- Green Card 73
- grey economy, *see* informal economy
- guest worker 28, 29, 36, 79, 88, 92
- Guinea 127
- Hague Programme 47
- harmonisation (policies/procedures) 76, 82–3, 96, 119–122, 133, 154
- healthcare 65–6, 81, 88, 149–50, 156, 167
- high-skilled labour 7, 11, 18, 30–1, 41–2, 48, 51, 63–4, 66, 71–7, 90, 140, 156
- see also* brain drain, labour demand, skill shortage
- Highly Skilled Migrants Programme (HSMP) 73
- see also* skills-based programme
- Horizon 2020 166
- Horn of Africa 107, 113, 115
- see also* individual countries, Africa, North Africa, West Africa
- household, *see* family migration
- human rights 19, 35, 37, 38, 84, 86, 94, 107, 114, 125–6, 131–2
- see also* European Convention on Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- human trafficking, *see* trafficking
- humanitarian 98, 134
- see also* Security and Immigration Decree
- Hungary:
- anti-immigration 1, 14, 29
 - asylum 53, 117, 122, 128
 - immigration control/policy 57, 145
 - integration 162
 - labour migration/workers 13, 25, 73, 169
- Iceland 52, 146
- identity 12, 35, 72, 74, 141, 145–8, 154, 157, 170, 174
- see also* European identity, identity card
- identity card 9, 138
- see also* passport, residence permit
- ideology 62, 72, 154, 161
- see also* left-wing, radical right, right-wing
- illegal immigration, *see* irregular immigration
- Immigration Act 110
- immigration control, *see* border control
- immigration countries, *see* countries of immigration
- immigration flows/policy 9, 10, 20, 25, 29–30, 38, 112, 114, 139, 151
- implementation, *see* administrative practice and implementation
- inclusion/incorporation, *see* integration
- India 26–9, 78
- inequality/inequalities 65, 67, 89, 101, 102–4, 148
- informal economy/work 37, 75, 104, 112
- institutionalisation 58–9
- integration:
- adaptation 20, 59–60, 155–8
 - Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 121, 166
 - civic integration 84, 91, 155–6, 159–60, 164, 168, 170
 - Common Agenda for Integration 166
 - Common Basic Principles for Immigration and Integration 166
 - European Agenda for the Integration of Third Country Nationals 166
 - European Integration Network 166
 - inclusion/incorporation 147, 158, 163

- integration measures 86–7, 90–1, 94–7,
 155, 163, 165–6
see also conditionality, double
 conditionality, malintegration
 internal migration 4
 international law 31, 50, 86, 111, 126,
 129–30
 international migration 11, 18, 23, 105,
 174–5
 definition of 4–5
 intervention (policy) 36, 39, 43, 51, 61–2,
 156
 intra-EU mobility 7, 20, 34, 136–7, 140–1,
 146, 153
 Iran 127
 Iraq 127
 Ireland, Republic of
 asylum 133
 family migration 93
 immigration control/policy 52, 77, 145,
 170
 integration 162
 labour migration/workers 6, 17, 25–7,
 29, 73, 81, 139, 169
 irregular immigration 9, 37, 41, 82,
 98–116
 Islam 35, 156, 170
 see also Muslim
 Italy:
 asylum 1, 32, 117, 118, 133–4
 family migration 31, 84
 immigration control/policy 8, 48, 75–6,
 81, 107, 122, 128, 132, 170
 integration 60, 146, 157, 162
 labour migration/workers 6, 13–14, 25,
 28–9, 64, 71, 78, 139, 169
 political parties 5, 27, 148–9

 Javid, Sajid 125
 Jordan 2, 78
 judicial branch 85
 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 50, 54
 Justice, Liberty and Security (JLS) 55, 159

 Khartoum Process 113

 labour demand 70, 80, 81, 85, 102
 see also high-skilled labour, low-skilled
 labour, seasonal labour migration,
 skill shortage
 Labour government (UK) 17, 73–5

 labour migration:
 conceptualisation 28–30, 64–6, 76–9,
 90, 97, 174
 definition of 19
 policy 30, 36–8, 42, 63–6, 69–73, 76–82
 see also individual EU countries,
 seasonal labour migration
 language (skills/requirements) 30, 71, 85,
 87, 90, 93, 146, 152, 154–5, 159,
 164
 language test 154–5, 164
 see also integration, border control,
 language
 Latin America 23, 34, 126
 see also individual countries
 Latvia 6, 25, 73, 169
 League, the 5
 Leave campaign 17, 142–3, 175
 see also Brexit
 Lebanon 2
 left-wing 36, 56, 72, 73, 75, 80, 150, 160–1
Lega, La 5
Lega Nord 76
 Lesbos 1, 5
 liberalism/liberal approaches 30, 37, 62,
 66, 74, 79, 93, 123, 150, 152
 Libya 98, 99, 107, 113
 Lichtenstein 52, 146
 Lisbon Agenda 165
 Lisbon Treaty 7–9, 47, 50, 51, 55
 Lithuania 25, 169
 low-skilled labour 11, 64–5, 71–2, 88, 101
 see also labour demand
 Luxembourg 25, 46, 50, 52, 137, 149, 169

 Maastricht Treaty 5, 8, 20, 46, 55, 119, 143
 making sense of migration, *see*
 sense-making
 Mali 79
 malintegration 42–3, 60, 64, 68, 80, 82,
 97, 118, 123
 Malta, Republic of 25, 98, 145, 152, 169
 marriage migration, *see* family migration,
 spouse
 marriage, forced 91
 May, Theresa 109
 Mediterranean (region) 1, 28, 49, 128
 Mediterranean Sea 2, 3, 26, 32, 98–100,
 105, 124, 173–4
 see also Aquarius, boat arrivals, sea
 border

- Merkel, Angela 53, 117, 127
- Middle East 8, 33–4, 46, 100, 126, 175, 176
see also individual countries
- migration control, *see* border control, civic integration, double conditionality, Frontex, language test, migration management, regulations, restrictions, secondary movement
- migration crisis (of 2015) 1–2, 16, 173
 asylum 31, 46, 117, 127, 129
 definition of 3
 family migration 89, 93
 policy 7, 45–6, 75, 99, 111, 132, 176
- migration drivers 32, 101, 105, 148
- migration, forced, *see* trafficking
- migration governance 7, 46, 115, 173, 175–6
see also border control, civic integration, double conditionality, Frontex, language test, migration management, regulations, restrictions, secondary movement, sense-making
- Migration and Home Affairs 49, 51, 54, 55
- migration industry 99, 105–6, 176
- migration management 48, 78–9, 86, 107
see also migration governance
- migration, permanent 22
- migration, undocumented 104
see also irregular immigration
- migration, voluntary 124
- mobility, definition of 4–5, 8–10
see also free movement, human rights, mobility rights
- Mobility Partnerships (MPF) 78
see also Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility, Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
- mobility rights 5, 8–9, 20, 23, 34, 136, 138–9, 152–3, 164
- mobilization (political) 57, 60–3, 115, 160–1
- Moldova 78
- Morocco 24, 26, 27, 28, 78, 113, 114
- Movimento 5 Stelle* 5, 76
- multicultural/multiculturalism 20, 35, 155–61, 170
see also integration
- multilevel politics 10–11, 17, 49, 56, 63, 105, 174
see also policymaking
- multilevelness, definition of 105
- Muslim 35, 154, 156–7, 170
see also Islam
- narratives 61, 68, 87, 100, 124, 138, 156
- national identity, *see* EU citizenship, European identity, identity card, passport, residence permit
- nationalist, *see* EU citizenship, populism, radical right
- native workers 19, 101, 150
- Netherlands, the:
 asylum 118, 132–3
 family migration 95–6
 immigration control/policy 36, 46, 66, 92, 94, 145, 149
 integration 155–7, 159, 164
 labour migration/workers 13–14, 22, 25, 28, 169
 political parties 148
- net migration 6, 17, 74–5
- networks:
 asylum/migrant 37, 82, 125, 128
 institutional 49, 54, 57, 59, 105
 smuggling 47, 98, 105–6, 108
 trafficking 101
- New York Protocol 33
- Newcomer Integration Act 155
- Nice Treaty 47, 56
- Niger 79, 107
- Nigeria 78, 79, 127
- non-deportability 114
see also deportation, return non-refoulement 33, 129, 134
- non-returnability, *see* non-deportability
- norms (social, cultural) 37, 58, 59, 84–5, 155–6, 158–9, 171
see also civic integration
- North Africa 28, 107, 131
see also individual countries, Africa, Horn of Africa, West Africa
- North America 22, 23
- North Macedonia 24, 25, 117, 146
- Northern Europe 132
- Northern League 76
- Norway 52, 54, 146, 169
- nuclear family, *see* family migration
- Oceania 22–4
- oil crisis 29
- opposition to immigration,
see anti-immigrant

- Orbán, Viktor 13, 38, 126, 128
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 13, 30–1
- origin country, *see* countries of origin
- overstay visa 36, 82, 98, 103
see also irregular immigration
- Pakistan 26, 27, 29, 127
- Parliament, *see* European Parliament
- partner, *see* same sex, spouse
- partnership 9, 78–9, 87, 107, 152
see also Mobility Partnerships, policy coordination
- passport 1, 9, 17, 138, 145, 172, 173
see also residence permit
- passport free travel 1, 17, 172, 173
- pension/pensioner 66–7, 77–8, 139, 149–50, 151, 156
see also retirement migration, social security
- perceptions 12–14, 34, 36, 49, 83, 106, 157, 173
see also attitudes, public opinion
- permanent migration/residence 22, 29–30, 33, 36–7, 68, 77–8, 92, 125, 134, 137–8, 152
- Poland:
 asylum 118, 128, 133
 family migration 136, 139
 immigration control/policy 1, 29, 57
 labour migration/workers 13–14, 25–7, 73, 81, 139, 150, 169
- policy, types of:
 admissions policy 31, 76–77, 81, 94–5, 98, 104, 108–9, 113, 165, 176
 asylum policy, *see* asylum
 labour migration policy 30, 36–8, 42, 63–6, 69–73, 76–82
 see also individual countries
- multicultural policy 20, 35, 155–6, 159, 161, 170
- refugee policy, *see* refugee
- policy:
 aims 48, 77–8, 84, 90, 107, 109, 122, 126, 138, 146–7
 coordination 55, 81, 138, 152, 165
 cycle model 39, 43, 125
 failure 4, 28, 35–39, 42, 68, 91, 159, 168, 170
 implementation, *see* administrative practice and implementation
- intervention 36, 39, 43, 51, 61–2, 156
- objectives 35, 37, 39, 49, 51, 62–3, 85, 91
- responses 3, 32, 39, 43, 109, 124, 155
- stream 42–3, 60
- polycymaking 5, 19, 38–40, 44, 60–1, 81, 113
see also multilevel politics, policy
- political debate 61, 68, 72–4, 79–80, 90–1, 108, 125, 126, 130, 147, 160–2, 177
- political elites 72–3, 127, 161
- politicisation
 of migration 12, 16, 45–6, 49, 61, 63, 75, 77, 90, 118, 134, 148, 160–1, 167, 173
 of mobility 34, 139, 142, 144, 148, 153
 see also Brexit
- population 4, 6, 13, 22–7, 35, 66–7, 75, 109, 150, 154, 156
see also ageing population
- populism 12, 36, 61, 72, 76, 148, 173, 176
see also anti-immigrant, racism, radical right, xenophobia
- port, *see* boat arrivals, Mediterranean Sea, sea border
- Portugal 6, 25, 28–9, 66, 71, 87, 139, 145, 147, 169
- primary caregivers 136, 152
- primary migration 88–90, 92
see also secondary migration
- principle of non-refoulement 33, 129, 134
- progressive/Progressives 16, 56
- protection/protection status, *see* asylum, refugee
- public opinion 12–14, 68, 100, 130, 143
see also attitudes, perceptions
- Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) 9, 18, 47, 128
- quotas 80, 127, 142
- Rabat Process 113
- race/ethnicity 20, 33, 103, 119, 129, 160, 163
- racist attitudes/racism 20, 15, 103, 158, 162–3
see also anti-immigrant, ethnic, populist, radical right, xenophobia
- radical right 142, 148, 161, 163
see also populism, right-wing

- Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) 113
- receiving countries, *see* countries of immigration
- recession 29, 74, 81
- referendum 26, 34, 141–3, 175
Brexit 16–17
- refugee:
- campus 43, 117
 - flows 22, 127
 - protection 118–21, 130, 132
 - resettlement 80, 131
 - status 31–4, 93, 111, 129, 133–5
see also European Refugee Fund, Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
- regularisation 27, 71, 80, 109, 112, 114
- Regulation 883/2004 150
- regulations, *see* Directives, restrictions
- religion 33, 119, 129, 160, 163
- relocation 2, 47, 56–8, 120–1, 128
- Remain campaign 142
- Republican model 160
see also assimilation, integration
- resettlement 31, 80, 128, 133, 166
- residence permit 2, 9, 71, 84, 134, 142, 145, 150, 155, 165, 174
- retirement migration 149–50
see also pension
- restrictions/restrictive approaches 27, 35, 37, 38, 66, 76–7, 84, 90, 96, 110, 120–2, 125–6, 134, 143, 153, 157, 176
see also border control, deportation, non-deportability, migration control, regulations
- return 24, 48, 56, 87, 102, 110–15, 128–9, 133, 150
see also deportation, European Union Return Directive, expulsion, voluntary return
- rhetoric 29, 38–41, 62, 64, 66, 76, 79–80, 126
- right to family life/right to found a family, *see* family migration, Directive of Family Reunification/the Right to Family Reunion
- right-wing 27, 36, 72, 149–50, 160–1, 173, 176
see also radical right
- Roma 152
- Romania 24–7, 52, 82, 137, 139, 150
- Russian Federation 23
- Sahel 107, 115
- salience 12, 14–16, 45–6, 61, 100, 123, 130, 142–3, 148, 173
- Salvini, Matteo 5, 76, 134
- same sex 87–8, 152
see also family migration, marriage migration, spouse
- Sánchez, Pedro 98
- Sarkozy, Nicolas 90
- Saudi Arabia 23
- Scandinavia 93
- Schengen:
- Schengen Agreement 46, 151
 - Schengen Borders Code 53, 102
 - Schengen Convention 52
 - Schengen Information System (SIS) 52–3, 102
- sea border 24, 52, 75, 107
see also Aquarius, boat arrivals, Mediterranean Sea
- seasonal labour migration 4, 22, 29, 70–1, 75, 77, 79, 85
see also temporary migration
- secondary migration 90
see also family migration, gender, primary migration
- second World War 19, 22, 33, 69
- secondary movement 1, 53, 118, 120–1, 125, 172
see also border control, Frontex
- security/securityisation 37–8, 52–3, 56, 98–99, 106, 108, 134, 173
internal 33, 34, 42, 102, 107
see also border control, restrictions
- Security and Immigration Decree 134
- sending countries, *see* countries of origin
- Senegal 78, 79
- sense-making 7, 11, 18, 28, 40, 60, 63
- Serbia 117
- settlement 29, 30, 36–7, 68, 92, 131
see also resettlement
- Single European Act 46, 57
- single-market integration 7, 46, 57, 140, 144, 157–8
- skill shortage 70, 73
see also brain drain, high-skilled labour, liberalism/liberal approaches, low-skilled labour

- Skilled Labour Immigration Law 75
see also high-skilled labour, skill shortage
- skills-based programmes 71
- Slovakia 1, 13, 14, 25, 29, 57, 73, 117, 128, 169
- Slovenia 25, 53, 73, 169
- smuggling 5, 20, 36–7, 47, 98–9, 101, 104–8, 112, 115
- social assistance 32, 69, 137–8, 152–3, 167
- social cohesion 38, 74
- social/societal conflict 160–1, 163
- Social Democrats 93, 173
- social protection 150, 152, 163
- social security 77, 134, 137, 138, 144, 152
see also entitlements, healthcare, pension, social assistance
- soft governance 154, 165–6
- Southern Europe 144, 147
see also individual countries
- sovereignty 10, 11, 37, 49, 76, 87, 94, 95, 136, 139, 172, 175
- Spain:
 asylum 118, 128
 family migration 84, 136
 immigration control/policy 5, 8, 23, 75, 78, 81, 145, 152
 integration 146, 162
 labour migration/workers 13–14, 24–6, 28–9, 30, 64, 71, 80, 139, 169–70
- spillover 83, 152, 158, 165
- spouse/partner 19, 31, 86–92, 96, 138, 152
see also family migration, marriage migration, same sex
- stateless 114, 119
- Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) 50
- subnational 18, 81, 158, 166, 167, 171
- subsidiary protection, *see* asylum, refugee
- sunset migration 149–50
- supranational 7, 18, 31, 47, 49, 50, 57, 104, 144, 147, 153, 166, 172, 174
- Sweden:
 asylum 117–18, 133
 family migration 89, 93
 immigration control/policy 54, 96, 132, 168
 labour migration/workers 6, 13–14, 17, 25, 73, 139, 149, 169
- Swiss People's Party 142
- Switzerland 28, 36, 52, 140–2, 156, 169
- Syria 1, 2, 53, 99–100, 117, 125–9, 133
- Tampere programme 47, 120, 163
- tax 67, 103, 144, 145, 152
- temporary migration/workers 4, 22, 29, 30, 36, 68, 71, 80, 82, 85, 92, 134, 136
see also seasonal migration
- terrorist/terrorism 35, 38, 147, 156
- Third Country Nationals (TCNs) 4, 8–10, 30, 34, 45, 64–5, 77, 94, 112, 114, 139, 144, 151, 164, 166, 174
- trafficking 5, 9, 36, 99, 101, 104, 106, 112
- transit countries 28, 114–5
- treaties:
 Treaty of Amsterdam 5, 46–7, 51–2, 55–6, 76, 119, 151, 163
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 9–10, 64, 137, 143
 Treaty of Lisbon 7–8, 47, 50–1, 55–6
 Treaty of Maastricht 5, 8, 20, 46, 55, 119, 143
 Treaty of Nice 47, 56
 Treaty of Rome 5, 8, 20, 140
- Tunisia 28, 78
- Turkey:
 asylum 2, 127, 129–30
 immigration control/policy 28, 53, 114, 128, 133
 integration 146
- types of migration, *see individual types*:
 chain, family, female, irregular, labour, seasonal, secondary, permanent, temporary, voluntary
- Ukraine 27
- United Nations (UN) 104
- UN Department for Social and Economic Affairs (UN DESA) 22
- UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 124
- UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 105
- unauthorised residence, *see* irregular immigration
- undocumented immigration, *see* irregular immigration

- unemployment 29, 70, 88, 141, 170
- United Arab Emirates 23
- United Kingdom (UK):
 - asylum 118, 122, 125, 133
 - family migration 31, 84, 91–3, 96
 - immigration control/policy 26, 29–30, 109, 132, 145, 168
 - integration 146, 155–6, 159, 162
 - labour migration/mobility 5–6, 13–14, 25–8, 52, 67, 73–5, 81, 109, 139–43, 169–70
 - see also individual countries*, Brexit, Common Travel Area, retirement migration
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 86

- Venezuela 127
- violence 43, 89, 126, 127, 156
 - see also* conflict, crime
- Visegrád Group/bloc 29, 57, 128, 175
- voluntary migration 124
- voluntary return 111
 - see also* Directive of Return, return
- von der Leyen, Ursula 124

- welfare:
 - provisions/services 69, 76, 80–1, 88, 124–5, 134, 138–9, 150, 152–3
 - shopping 141, 153
 - state 20, 32, 34, 67, 72, 84, 93, 115, 148, 161–2, 168–71, 174
 - see also* entitlements, social assistance
- West Africa 28, 113
 - see also individual countries*, Africa, Horn of Africa, North Africa
- West/Western Europe 28–9, 31–34, 69, 122
 - see also individual countries*, Central Europe, Eastern Europe
- West Germany 28, 36
- West Indies 28
- women 81, 84, 89, 90, 104, 157, 159
 - see also* female migration, gender
- World War II 19, 22, 33, 69

- xenophobia 12, 150
 - see also* anti-immigrant, populism, racism

- Yugoslavia 28, 46, 125