6 'Gender(ed) nationalism' of the populist radical right

An extreme typicality

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Introduction

In spring 2012, just before International Women's Day, the initiative Women against Islamisation went public. Led by the Belgian populist radical right (PRR) party Vlaams Belang (VB), the initiative presented itself as a European wide enterprise. Speakers from several European countries, including the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) (OTS, 2012) took part at the launch. The initiative's aim is to defend the 'freedom and the dignity of women' in light of an increasing 'Islamisation' of Europe (Women against Islamization, 2017).

This event is paradigmatic for three intertwined developments within the PRR since the late 1990s: first, the adoption of Muslim immigrants as a major target group, second, the evolution of a common transnational political agenda, characterised by an intensified cooperation across PRR parties (Rosenberger & Hadj-Abdou, 2013) and consequently, the diffusion of restrictive policy ideas and a corresponding rhetoric, from one PRR party to the other (Mudde, 2007, p. 84). Third, there is also the development of a strong emphasis across different PRR parties on the issue of gender equality (Akkerman, 2015; Hadj-Abdou, 2010, 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2015). This last development in particular is astonishing, given that many PRR parties have been known for exhibiting explicitly conservative-nationalist gender policy positions (Amesberger & Halbmayr, 2002).

This chapter focuses on this puzzling emphasis on gender equality by the PRR, using one of the most successful European parties of the PRR, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), as a case study. The aim of this chapter is to trace this (re)positioning of the party in regard to gender over time, and to analyse this turn. First, it shows that different variants of gender(ed) nationalism exist in parallel. On the one hand, in terms of substantive policies, ultra-conservative, nationalist conceptions of gender relations prevail. On the other hand, references to gender equality and women's rights have become a core element of boundary making in the discourses of the FPÖ, establishing 'Europeanised' nationalist narratives of the 'self' and the 'other'. Second, the chapter argues that this latter evolution is strongly related to a transformation of nationalism in Europe, which having become 'Europeanised', relies on a Muslim other. In order to describe the

instrumental use of gender equality in these nationalist narratives by the PRR, the definition 'gender nationalism' is used here. This term captures not only recent developments but emphasises the centrality and historic continuity of the role of gender in exclusionary imaginations about the nation (Yuval-Davis, 1997, 2011). Third, the chapter examines whether this boundary making strategy is effective, by looking at how far the FPÖ has been able to set the agenda. Has gender nationalism spread to other major political parties, and has this manifested itself in actual policies? Finally, the chapter concludes that we can speak of gender nationalism today as an 'extreme typicality', to adapt the framing of Spierings and Zaslove (2015, p. 170) (see Mudde, 2010). Although, from a comparative perspective, this has happened with some delay, a variant of gender nationalism promoting the exclusion of Islam and Muslim immigrants is nowadays the new normal in Austria. While the country's PRR has represented this variant of gender nationalism to an intensified degree, it is thus in no way an exception any longer in doing so.

The diagnosis is particularly interesting in the Austrian context, given that it has one of the most accommodating arrangements as regards the Islamic religion in Europe (Hadj-Abdou, Siim, Rosenberger & Saharso, 2012). Claims for a prohibition of Muslim head and body-covering, for instance, have been long a taboo in this country (Hadj-Abdou et al., 2012).

While this chapter provides detailed insights about Austria and the FPÖ, it contributes to the wider debate on populism and gender. Populism has been undoubtedly one of the most researched topics in the social sciences: the relationship between gender and populism, however, remains among the most understudied issues so far (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2015, p. 36). In the recent past, a series of excellent research papers (e.g. Akkerman, 2015; Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007; Brubaker, 2017; De Lange & Mügge, 2015; Fekete, 2006; Meret & Siim, 2013; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2015; Vieten, 2016) have been published which have significantly raised our knowledge on this issue. In particular, their systematic, comparative perspective has contributed to the understanding of the peculiarities of the PRR party family as regards its position on gender. This chapter builds upon these works, and seeks to provide some context and in-depth perspectives on the FPÖ, to contribute to these already existing studies. The analysis of the rhetoric and the policy positions of the FPÖ as regards gender relations is based on a qualitative content analysis of party material (party programmes, electoral manifestos, party handbooks and press releases) from 1999 onwards.

The chapter is structured in five parts: in the following section, an overview of the FPÖ will be provided. The section describes the electoral strength of the party, and its electoral strategies over time. It also looks at the gender dimension, as regards the electorate as well as party representatives. In the next section, the party's policy positions over time on the issues of gender and women will be discussed. Then the use of gender equality references as a boundary making strategy will be analysed. The last section of the chapter discusses the efficacy of the party's gender nationalism in terms of its impact on the political centre parties and policy outputs.

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The FPÖ – A Männerpartei, with multiple, thin ideologies

Austria has been often described as the 'heartland' (Bale & Gruber, 2014, p. 6) of the PRR, given that the FPÖ emerged earlier and has been more successful than most of its fellow PRR parties in Europe. From 2000 to 2006 the Austrian PRR has been also part of the national government. In the last general election in October 2017, the FPÖ obtained nearly 26 per cent of the vote. At the time of writing this chapter, the party is about to enter again national government in coalition with the Conservative Party (ÖVP). The electoral strength of the party is also indicated by the 2016 presidential elections, in which the party's candidate Nobert Hofer reached 46.2 per cent of the vote (2,124,661 votes).

Shifting and co-existing nationalisms as a vote maximising strategy

In contrast to many newly founded PRR parties, the party belongs to a second group of PRR parties which emerged as a result of the transformation of an established party into a PRR party (Helms, 1997). Its transformation from a German nationalist fringe party into the Western PRR success model started in 1986, when Jörg Haider took over the leadership of the party.

At its foundation in 1949, the goal of the FPÖ's predecessor party, Federation of Independents (VDU), was to attract former National Socialists and war returnees (Luther, 2000, p. 427), or as the VDU framed it to serve as the 'respected and un-incriminated representatives of the interests of registered National Socialists'

Table 6.1 FPÖ National election results (including splinter party BZÖ)

Year	Votes	Percentage	Seats	Rank
2017	1,316,442	25.97	51	3
2013	962,313 (FPÖ)	20.5	40	3
	165,746 (BZÖ)	3.5	–	7
2008	857,029 (FPÖ)	17.5	34	3
	522,933 (BZÖ)	10.7	21	4
2006	519,598 (FPÖ)	11	21	4
	193,539 (BZÖ)	4.1	7	5
2002	491,328	10.0	18	3
1999	1,244,087	26.9	52	2
1995	1,060,377	21.9	41	3
1994	1,042,332	22.5	42	3
1990	782,648	16.6	33	3
1986	472,205	9.7	18	3
1983	241,789	5.0	12	3

Source: Federal Ministry of Interior, 2017; own compilation.

(cited in Murphy, 2004, p. 304). In the late 1970s and in the 1980s, the party went through a liberal phase, while maintaining a strong ideological orientation towards German nationalism at the grass roots level (Bailer & Neugebauer, 1998). In the 1990s, under the leadership of Jörg Haider, the party adopted the 'thin' ideology of populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6) to turn itself into a highly successful political force. This type of thin ideology claims to represent the people, understood as an entity. Populism stands in stark contrast to a pluralistic, interested, guided understanding of democratic politics (Müller, 2016). It is about constructing and exploiting the binary of the (pure) people versus the (corrupt) elites (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Taggart, 2000). Haider attached to populism the (also rather thin) ideology of Austrian nationalism, paired with a strong anti-immigrant agenda. A commitment to 'Austrian patriotism' was eventually inserted in the party manifesto in 1997 (Luther, 2006, p. 379). Rather than reflecting a political conviction of the party, let alone a clear rejection of German nationalism, the adoption of Austrian patriotism was a vote maximising strategy (Luther, 2006). German nationalism did not resonate with the electorate. In the late 1980s, only 6 per cent of the Austrian population still thought of themselves as Germans (Brückmüller, 1998, p. 16).

Under the leadership of Heinz Christian Strache, who has chaired the party since 2005, the type of nationalism propagated by the FPÖ has shifted again. To be more precise, the ideological foundation of the nationalism propagated by the FPÖ nowadays has several layers, each layer addressing a distinct electorate. Strache strengthened anew the branch of the party ideologically attached to German nationalism, after Haider had previously significantly reduced it (Weidinger, 2017). In 2011, the party also reintroduced the commitment to the German ethnic and cultural community into its party programme (*Deutsche Volks-und Kulturgemeinschaft*) (Weidinger, 2017, p. 127). This German nationalism targets party members and sympathisers of the political spectrum of the extreme right. The party at the same time continued to exhibit an Austrian patriotism, seeking to address the conservative (and often nativist) Austrian electorate. Finally, a third, complementary layer of nationalism has evolved, which will be discussed more in-depth later in this chapter. This is a 'Europeanised' version of nationalism, which operates with strong references to gender equality. This latter move can be interpreted as an attempt to appeal to 'nativist modernists' (Spierings, Lubbers & Zaslove, 2017), a group of the electorate which, while nativist, endorses certain liberal values.

The FPÖ – still a '*Männerpartei*'?

Does this imply that the party has also 'modernised' itself in the sense that it distinguishes itself from a typical PRR 'Männerpartei'? There is actually little evidence for this diagnosis. With the exception of 2002, the party never passed the 25 per cent mark in terms of female members of parliament. However, from 1986 to 1994 and in 1999, the conservative People's Party (ÖVP) had actually a smaller share of female representatives in the national assembly than the FPÖ

(Steininger, 2000). It is also noteworthy that the first female vice chancellor was a member of the Freedom Party (Susanne Riess-Passer, 2000–2003). The second woman to serve as one of the presidents of parliament in the Second Republic was also a member of the FPÖ (Heide Schmidt, 1990–1994). So while the party had a couple of female leading figures, and the 'gender gap' of representatives is not a unique trait of the PRR, in overall numbers, there is a clear under-representation of female MPs in the FPÖ. From the 40 parliamentary seats won in the 2013 general election, for instance, only 7 were held by women. During this legislative period, the female ratio of 18 per cent was smaller than in any other parliamentary party. In contrast to the other major parties, which have either female quotas in place (SPÖ, Greens), or have women's sections that have advocated at some point for quota arrangements (ÖVP) (Die Presse, 2017), the FPÖ – including its women's section – has been consistently, and strictly, against any female quotas.

In terms of the electorate, we also find a clear gender gap. The FPÖ electorate has been substantially male dominated (Forum Politische Bildung, 2006; Plasser & Ulram, 2000). While in the 2017 general election this gap became actually smaller compared to the previous election, a significant gender gap persists over time. In 2013, polls showed that 29 per cent of male voters opted for the FPÖ, whereas only 16 per cent of women voted for them (SORA, 2013). At the 2017 elections in turn 22 per cent of women voted for the FPÖ as opposed to 29 per cent of men (SORA, 2017).

As Spierings and Zaslove (2015) remind us, though, there is scarcely any difference between men and women in terms of anti-immigrant attitudes. This holds true also for Austria (Friesl, Renner & Wieser, 2010, p. 18). This consequently suggests that the female electorate provides a significant potential of growth for PRR parties such as the FPÖ. However, their research (Spierings & Zaslove, 2015) also suggests that the populist ideology might be one of the explanatory factors, in addition to the different professional profiles of men and women, as to why women are less likely to vote for the PRR. Harteveld, van der Brug, Dahlberg, and Kokkonen (2015) come to a similar conclusion. However, Mayer (2013) in turn has shown, as regards the French Front National that increasing the female electorate is a viable path for the PRR, particularly under a female leader.

As for now, based on its electorate and on the gender composition of it representatives, the FPÖ clearly qualifies as a 'Männerpartei'. But this does not necessarily imply a poor substantive representation as well (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2015). Scholarship (Celis, 2008, p. 86) has taught us that there is actually no clear-cut link between numerical female representation and substantive representation. In order to make any judgements on the substantive representation of women, we have to look at the policy agenda of the FPÖ. To be sure, the character of a 'Männerpartei' is actually mirrored in a wide array of policy positions of the FPÖ, which will be shown in the next section. Ultra-conservative positions in the field of gender relations are a constant over time. The low numerical representation thus correlates with low substantive representation.

FPÖ's policy position on women and gender equality

The issue of women has become a prominent issue for the party since the mid-1990s, as the FPÖ was attempting to increase its female vote. In 1996, the 'Initiative of freedomnite women' (*Initiative freiheitlicher Frauen*) was founded under the leadership of Jörg Haider (Hauch, 2000, p. 79). At the beginning of the national electoral year in 1999, the party proclaimed a political repositioning and a programmatic shift of policies to children, women and family, in order to attract new female voters, with 'soft issues' as Haider put it (Hauch, 2000, p. 75). These policies primarily conceptualised women as mothers. Beyond this role as mothers women were addressed to a very limited extent.

Family and reproduction

The position of the party as regards the role of women (and family) in society has remained stable over the years, this is reflected in all the party material analysed since 1999. The heterosexual family is seen as the foundation of society. Policy proposals for women are basically equated with family policies. In the 2013 party handbook, family is accordingly defined as the core (literally: nucleus) and the glue (*Keimzelle und Klammer*) of a functioning society (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 131). While the party currently discursively emphasises 'freedom of choice', between being a working mother or a stay-at-home mother, the clear (policy) prioritisation is on the stay-at-home mother (FPÖ, 2002, p. 37, 2013a, p. 134). In sum, women are predominantly and foremost conceptualised as mothers. Family policy is essentially based on a model of male breadwinners and female caregivers, as expressed through policies such as taxation benefits for sole earners (Mayer, Ajanovic & Sauer, 2014, p. 257). This concept of women as mothers is, in turn, based on ultra-conservative, statist ideas of gender relations, as the following statements (FPÖ, 2013b, p. 32) make clear:

> The man who has been thrown from his throne as the head of family is longing in an unchanged manner for a partner . . . whose brood care instinct outweighs imposed ambitions of self-realization. The . . . woman is still longing in an unchanged manner for a solid man, who provides her with all emotional and economic security needed by a young mother in order to dedicate herself fully and without any great worries, to her offspring. Both desires are not met [today].
>
> (FPÖ, 2013b, p. 32 – translation L.H.A.)

The party's focus has been continuously on a variety of policy measures that stimulate an increase of reproduction within native families, which are supposed to serve 'the survival of the nation' (*Überleben unseres Volkes*) (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 47). This nation is seen as endangered by immigration (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 31). Measures in support of maintaining the role of women as mothers are thus (more or less implicitly) seen as a matter of keeping the nation 'pure'. In this line of

thought, the nation is not only a community of spirit: it is a community whose spirit is transferred biologically from one generation to the next.

These visions also correspond to a restrictive policy position on the issue of abortion, which started to become a major focus of the party from the mid-2000s. Before that, restrictive claims had not been placed prominently on the party's agenda. In 1999, a FPÖ parliamentarian tried to abolish the right to abortion, but was met with resistance by the rest of the party at the time (ORF, 2012). This policy shift can be seen as a rapprochement with the nativist, Catholic electorate (Hadj-Abdou, 2016,p. 43).

Abortion today is conceptualised by the FPÖ as being responsible for many psychological and physical illnesses of women (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 134). In response, various measures (such as the establishment of a foundation for the protection of human life, or the introduction of nationwide statistical documentation about abortion) are called for by the FPÖ, aimed at preventing abortions. Referring to numbers of aborted foetuses in the country, the party described the uterus as the space with the highest probability of dying (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 160). The issue of abortion, especially, suggests that the party did undergo a certain radicalisation in their programmatic under the leadership of Strache.

Marriage and adoption for homosexuals are rejected (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 142) by the FPÖ as well. This restrictive position was upheld during the party participation in national government, and was lately confirmed anew after the Austrian Green Party's attempt to introduce marriage equality in a parliamentary motion in June 2017 (FPÖ, 2017).

Another indicator of the ultra-conservative position as regards gender relations is the current approach of the party to domestic violence. The right to evict a man from his home in cases of domestic violence is portrayed by the party as being misused by women. The party, hence, calls for a softening of this protective provision. It demands the cutting down of the current period of up to 6 months of possible eviction to half of that time (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 159). Most notably, a local head of party has also repeatedly called for the abolishment of women's shelters. As particular FPÖ politicians claim, women's shelters are contributing significantly to the destruction of marriages and partnerships (Auinger, 2017, p. 37).

Opposing the 'gender' threat

Instruments such as gender mainstreaming are seen as ideologically driven, that are based on the – in the perception of the FPÖ – misguided idea that gender is socially constructed, and these policy instruments are thus firmly rejected. In the 2002 electoral manifestation (FPÖ, 2002, p. 42), in a period when the FPÖ participated in government, the party still emphasised that it had contributed to the establishment of an intergovernmental working group on Gender Mainstreaming. Today, the dissolution of conservative and static, 'natural' gender roles, which is seen as driven by measures such as gender mainstreaming, is portrayed as the reason for 'child abuse', 'hatred against men or women', and even feelings of 'aggression leading to rampages' (FPÖ, 2013b, p. 113). This behaviour

according to the party is a reaction to compensate for the societal 'abnormalities' of gender ideas (Auinger, 2017, p. 27; FPÖ, 2013b, p. 32). In sum, the responsibility for aggressive, hateful and abusive behaviour is ascribed to the spread of ideas about gender as being socially constructed. Thus, (male) perpetrators are turned into victims.

In line with its populist anti-establishment attitude, gender mainstreaming is seen by the party as being pushed through top down, in an entirely undemocratic manner (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 136). According to the party, gender mainstreaming carries the hidden 'totalitarian' agenda of destroying identities 'in cultural and societal' terms, wanting to create 'the new human [being]' without any gender identities (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 136). The promotion of the idea of the constructed nature of gender is thus seen as an attempt to 'manipulate' the people, a common project of communism and capitalism (FPÖ, 2013a). Policy measures and concepts such as gender mainstreaming are consequently labelled as an 'ideological gender reassignment' (FPÖ, 2013a). The reference to a leftist or capitalist project or even a conspiracy, which acts against the interests of the people, is a well-known populist strategy. Even in the case that populists are themselves powerholders as Jan-Werner Müller (2016, pp. 68–69) reminds us, the reference to corrupted elites that supposedly hold control in the background, is a powerful instrument to reify the legitimacy of populists. Karin Stögner (2017, p. 154) identifies this strategy of combining the antagonistic ideologies of communism and capitalism as an anti-Semitic stereotype pattern, reminding us that this has been a common rhetorical strategy and othering process against Jewish people (*the capitalist, bolshevist Jew*).

In overall terms, we see a continuous equation of women's policies with pro-family policies. We can see moreover a more pronounced, radical position as regards gender relations from the middle of the first decade in the twenty-first century onwards, when Strache took power within the party. Most notably, as a result, nowadays, the FPÖ includes a more explicit 'anti-gender' position, opposing anti-essentialist understandings of gender relations. The rhetoric of the FPÖ was more moderate during its participation in government, as the party was aiming to exhibit a more liberal appearance. This does not necessarily imply however that the ideological convictions of the FPÖ were fundamentally different during their participation in government. On the contrary, it is worth noting that the first FPÖ/ÖVP coalition (2000) did actually abolish the Ministry of Women's Affairs. This action was as a highly symbolic and value-laden measure. In place of the Women's Ministry, a department for men was established within the Ministry for Generations and Social Security, led by a male FPÖ minister.

The classification of women as primarily mothers and the perspective on gender mainstreaming as a threat to identity (socially and culturally) reveal a deep connection to classical nationalist conceptions of gender relations. It is the women who reproduce the nation culturally, and secure its existence across generations (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Gender and instruments such as gender mainstreaming are hence not simply rejected because they do not correspond to conservative ideas of family life; they are rejected because they are seen as a betrayal and a threat to

the nation. The policy positions of the FPÖ are, thus, not merely conservative, but are deeply entrenched in nationalism, an ideology which has never been gender neutral, but always gendered. Imagining the bodies of women and their reproductive powers as the saviours of the nation have been central instruments of nationalist ideologies throughout history (Yuval-Davis, 1997).

My diagnosis corresponds thus to that of Akkerman (2015), who in her comparative study finds that the FPÖ is a 'unreservedly conservative party. The party is to some extent also characterised by a misogynist discourse, as is for instance reflected in their policies on women's shelters. This misogynist discourse of the FPÖ finally might be a peculiar phenomenon of the Austrian PRR, given that Mudde and Kaltwasser (2015) find that in Northern Europe, populists do not exhibit an explicitly sexist discourse.

In more than one way, the party exhibits a deeply gendered nationalism. As a part of this gender(ed) nationalism, we also see a pronounced anti-gender position, which has been in recent years also a growing concern of restrictionist social movements that aim to halt or revert social change. Such movements include the right extreme identitarian (*Die Identitären*) movement (see Mayer et al., 2014) or the French 'Protests for Everyone' (*Manif pour tous*) movement (Sauer, 2017), who advocate against rights for homosexuals. This anti-gender attitude, thus, enables and strengthens potential alliances, with actors of the political right-extremist spectrum. While officially the party avoids presenting itself openly as an ally of these types of social movements, regular informal exchanges and engagements of members of the identitarian movement in FPÖ organisations have been reported (DÖW, 2016).

Using gender equality as a boundary making strategy

The 'classical' gendered nationalist agenda of the FPÖ has been combined since the middle of the first decade in the twenty-first century with a second type of gender(ed) nationalism, expressed through an explicit gender equality rhetoric, which is closely linked to an anti-Islam and anti-Muslim agenda. Research on the PRR has found that this type of gender nationalism is common within many Western European PRR parties since the mid-1990s (Vieten, 2016, p. 624). In that regard, the FPÖ is a latecomer. References to gender equality only emerged with the take-over of the leadership by Heinz Christian Strache. As suggested before, this delay can be partly explained by the fact that in 2000, the party entered national government, and had to tone down its anti-immigrant rhetoric, given also the heightened attention by the international community and the European Union at the time (Rosenberger & Hadj-Abdou, 2013). To give an example of this moderate public appearance, in 2004, the FPÖ did not utter any form of public protest when the Minister of Education (ÖVP) issued a decree that the wearing of the headscarf by pupils is regulated as a religious right that cannot be restricted by any institution (Rosenberger & Hadj-Abdou, 2013, p. 152).

After the split of the party in 2005 into ideologically nearly identical parties (the BZÖ and the FPÖ), the new FPÖ under Strache successfully used the issue

of Islam to distinguish the party from its competitor (Rosenberger & Hadj-Abdou, 2013, p.153), catching up with the developments in other PRR parties across Western Europe. At the core of this anti-Islam-agenda was the portrayal of Islam and Muslims as a culture that oppresses women. Already in spring 2001, the Haider-FPÖ had held a discussion on female genital mutilation (FGM), underlining that immigration had brought FGM to Europe. It was however stated that this social practice is condemned by Muslim scholars and the Quran (OTS, 2001). This differentiated line of argumentation has now faded away, and has been substituted by a clear discursive formation of binary opposition between pre-modern Islam which oppresses women and a modern European *Leitkultur*, characterised by liberal core values such as gender equality. This new pattern emerged first in the framework of the FPÖ debate on the accession of Turkey to the EU in 2004 and has been intensified from 2005 onwards.

Oppressive Muslim practices were put in the spotlight, in order to point to alleged irreconcilable cultural differences and backwardness of Muslim immigrants. For instance, in the national electoral campaign of 2006, one of the main slogans used was 'free women instead of forced veiling' (*Freie Frauen statt Kopftuchzwang*). The main goal of these continuously recited narratives was basically the restriction of immigration (Fekete, 2006) and the reproduction of a nationalist tale of 'us' versus 'them'. This discursive legitimisation of restrictive immigration regulations is also highlighted by the fact that these gender equality references were rarely ever accompanied by policy proposals for migrant women, other than the restriction of Muslim practices (Akkerman, 2015, p. 53).

From the late 2000s onwards, the issue of security started to be linked with the gender equality discourse. The theme of sexualised crimes committed by Muslims had started to emerge and intensify. This line of argumentation was boosted by the sexual assaults incidents during the New Years' celebrations in the German city of Cologne in 2015/2016, which have been widely met in the public sphere with racialised notions about sexual violence. Consequently, sexual crimes towards native Austrian women committed by asylum seekers were among the main foci of the party in 2016 and 2017. The Muslim, asylum seeking rapist is today a powerful image in the public discourse: an image relied on by the FPÖ.

These othering processes, which are a core discursive strategy of not only the FPÖ but many PRR parties today, have to be situated into a wider context. First, we have to relate these developments to a shift from questions of economic distribution to those of identity and values (Fraser, 1995) in a post-1989 Europe. This shift is not a mere expression of PRR politics, but lies at the very heart of the emergence and growth of the PRR.

Second, this development was also accompanied by a new understanding of immigrant integration. Integration politics, in the past decades have 'burst out of their specific policy domain and entered the civic sphere, where the conditions and nature of belonging are negotiated' (Uitermark, 2010, p. 6). Integration hence became a battlefield of nationalism and a core arena for the 'dirty work' (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 204) of boundary making and maintenance. The message 'work, pay tax, don't hit your children and show respect for equal rights between the

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sexes', for instance, which the Danish Ministry of Integration displayed in 2006 on its webpage (Fekete, 2006, p. 3) captures this trend in a nutshell.

Third, post-1989 European nation-states have become increasingly Europeanised as a result of the European integration process. The very fact that nationalist narratives rely on references to gender equality, which is framed as a European value, and the trope of the Muslim 'other' suggest that nationalism actually underwent a certain Europeanisation.

As Matti Bunzl (2005) has poignantly captured it, modern anti-Semitism is a product of the nineteenth century and was closely related to nationalism and the emergence of the nation-state, whereby the Jewish 'other' served primarily as a marker of who did or did not belong to the national community. The construction of the 'Muslim other' in contrast defines who belongs and who does not belong to Europe. As Bunzl (2005, p. 502) notes, those that mobilise against the 'Muslim other' are not concerned whether 'Muslims can be good Germans, Italians or Danes'; rather, they question whether Muslims can be good Europeans. Gender nationalism hence functions not exclusively or primarily in the interest of national, ethnic purification, but also as an instrument to legitimise the tightening of European borders in the face of international (to a great extent Muslim) migration. This migration, moreover, is characterised nowadays to a large extent by family reunification, and so the focus on migrant women and gender relations, hence seems plausibly also connected to this changing pattern of immigration (Akkerman, 2015).

This emergence of 'civilizationalism', as Brubaker (2017) has recently framed it, as a boundary making strategy thus represents a relatively new form of gender(ed) nationalism, which distinguishes itself from other variants of gender(ed) nationalisms through the reference to liberal values. This type of nationalism, however, certainly is not a PRR invention nor is it an entirely novel product. The topos of the oppression of women was also used in colonialist discourses to legitimise colonial rule, as has been shown by Leila Ahmed (1992) in her seminal work on women and gender in Islam. The practice of Muslim veiling was seen by the colonisers in the Middle East as proof of the 'quintessential otherness and inferiority of Islam' (Ahmed, 1992, p. 149) and a symbol of the oppression of women. Those who were the fiercest advocates against the oppression of women in the colonies, however, were at the same time advocates against women's rights at home, as demonstrated for instance by the cited example by Ahmed of the British Lord Cromer, who unveiled Egyptian women but at the same time opposed female suffrage in Britain (Ahmed, 1992, pp. 152–153). The gender nationalism of the FPÖ is a modern variant of this colonial pattern, though, as noted before, today it does not serve the justification of colonial power but to legitimise tighter immigration controls.

This 'new' type of gender nationalism co-exists with the more classical type of gender nationalism. The rhetorical commitment to gender equality in this new variant of gender nationalism seems to contradict the one that relies on an ultra-conservative understanding of gender relations. However, actually these two variants of gendered nationalism complement each other, in the sense that they

speak to two different audiences: modernised nativists including women, at the one end, and conservative nativists at the other. Although contradictory in content, they do not stand in each other's way. While, the 'classic' variant of gender(ed) nationalism is accompanied by substantive policy proposals, the second one remains largely rhetorical.

Another potential reason why these two contradictory variants of gender(ed) nationalisms are compatible and seem moreover to resonate with a wider electorate is the conceptualisation of gender equality within this electorate. Although there is indeed a strong commitment to gender equality, this commitment remains to some extent abstract. A total of 64 per cent of Austrians surveyed, for instance, view equality between men and women as a fundamental right (Eurobarometer, 2015, p. 31). However, when asked whether inequality between man and women has to be tackled, only 49 per cent of the Austrian respondents fully agree (Eurobarometer, 2015, p. 32). Both, the FPÖ's use of gender equality as a marker of identity as well as its conservative concept of gender relations, thus, seem to be to some extent in tune with the Austrian public attitude.

Gender nationalism of the radical right – An extreme typicality

Having detected the presence of different types of gender nationalisms as part of the FPÖ's repertoire to appeal to the electorate, in this final section, we will now turn to question how far the party was able to have a wider impact in terms of the establishment of restrictive policies (be it restrictive immigration policies or restrictions on Muslim practices). Indeed, it has to be noted that gender-nationalism targeting Muslims has been also adopted by other parties, most notably the ÖVP, and this can be interpreted as a result of the intensive FPÖ anti-Islam discourse.

In the national election campaign of 2008, the ÖVP, for instance, claimed that 'immigrants from other cultures have to accept that women in Austria are emancipated. . . . Zero tolerance for cultural setback' (ÖVP Vienna, 2008). In the same year the then interior minister, also of the ÖVP called for the enshrining of the term 'culture crimes' (*Kulturdelikte*) in the Austrian penal code to distinguish criminal, acts such as 'honour killings' from other supposedly culturally neutral types of murder (that is murders committed by natives) (Falter, 2008).

While this policy proposal was not successful at the time, we can, however, see a continuous restriction in other relevant areas, most notably in the field of immigration and asylum in Austria. These policies were adopted by the government to appease the PRR, and to win (back) the electorate from the FPÖ. Tightened immigration and border controls represent 'the normalization of securitized boundaries of nationhood, culture, and gender in response to requests and fears capitalized' (on by the PPR) (Kinnvall, 2015, p. 526).

The fact that the 'new' gendered boundary making strategy by the radical right has been successful is also suggested by the recent prohibition of full veiling in all public spaces in Austria, which came into effect in autumn 2017. Non-compliance is penalised with a fine of 150 Euros. According to estimates that

have been used by both advocates and opponents of the ban, about 150 women in Austria fully cover themselves (Wiener Zeitung, 2017). It is thus, largely a symbolic policy, reaffirming the boundaries of 'us' and 'them', rather than a substantive policy dealing with a real problem.

Another issue is the trend towards value tests for immigrants, and particularly asylum seekers. These tests are a significant component of immigration and immigrant integration policy in Austria. According to the 2017 integration law, value training courses are obligatory for recognised refugees and are coupled with social benefits. The training materials for these value courses include strong references to gender equality, and for instance 'teach' immigrants that 'women can have a job, can walk alone in public, can meet female and male friends, can have and end relationships, and can drive cars on their own', and that men are not to be regarded as the 'head of family' (*Familienoberhaupt*) (ÖIF, 2017). Gender nationalism seems to have become a sort of 'normal typicality' in Austria.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the issue of gender nationalism of the Austrian PRR that is the phenomenon that nationalist narratives are strongly gendered. To provide a context to gender nationalism in the PRR, the chapter has first described the existing gender gap in terms of political representation and within the party's electorate, underlining that in both aspects the party represents a 'Männerpartei'. It then has argued that we find a combination of different variants of gender(ed) nationalism present in the rhetoric and ideology of the Austrian populist right. The first operates with ultra-conservative notions of motherhood and a corresponding equation of women as mothers. Women are seen as the symbolic border guards of the nation. In these nationalist imaginations, the native woman reproduces the nation by giving birth, and transfers its culture and identity from one generation to the next. The second, and more recent variant of gender nationalism, in turn uses a boundary making strategy that relies on the reference to the liberal value of gender equality and female emancipation as demarcation line between the native and the alien (Muslim) 'other'. This latter variant of gender nationalism, in particular the strategic reference to gender equality, can be also interpreted as a vote maximising strategy. Indeed female voters, and/or nativist modernists provide a strong potential for further growth for the PRR. Furthermore, the rather paradoxical combination of ultra-conservative policy positions with a rhetorical reference to gender equality seems to be somewhat in tune with the attitudes of large parts of the electorate, rather than challenging them. Hence, we can expect that both variants of gender nationalism will remain central components of the strategic and ideological repertoire of the party.

Finally, the chapter has also attempted to provide some explanations for the emergence of this new gender nationalism which is operating with strong references to gender equality. It has argued that its emergence is rooted in three developments. These are: first, the shift from the politics of redistribution to those of identity; second the transformation of the policy field of immigrant integration

to a field of the contentious politics of belonging and third, a shift from exclusively 'national' nationalisms to a 'Europeanised nationalism'. The chapter has finally also discussed the wider impact of the gender nationalism used by the FPÖ. It concludes that the second Europeanised version of gender nationalism, rather than being an exceptional phenomenon of the populist radical right, has become an 'extreme typicality'.

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